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Introduction
William S. Kern
Western Michigan University

Open to the sports pages of your local newspaper today and you
are likely to find that discussions of the economic aspects of sports
occupy as much space as do the results of the games. As Americans’
discretionary incomes have risen, so has their demand for sports, as
both participants and spectators. As a consequence of this increase in
demand, we are now witness to professional athletes commanding
long-term contracts of over $100 million. Cities are bidding against
one another to acquire professional sports franchises with offers of new
stadiums costing upwards of $500 million. Spectators are willing to
pay “street prices” as high as $3,200 for tickets to the Super Bowl and
$4,000 for tickets to college basketball’s “Final Four.” And professional sports owners and players’ unions perennially talk about the
possibility of strikes to resolve their differences over dividing up the
multibillion dollar sports revenue pie. Clearly, sports has become “big
business.”
As the sports industry has grown, it has attracted the attention of
economists, and sports economics is now a growing subfield within the
economics profession. The organization of the sports leagues has been
fertile ground for economists interested in industrial organization questions. The labor markets for professional athletes have been of interest
to labor economists, given the abundance of statistics related to player
performance and productivity and the unique features of these labor
markets such as the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) salary
cap. The development of free agency in sports, the behavior of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association in regulating collegiate sports,
and the growing use of “personal seat licenses” by National Football
League (NFL) teams have provided additional opportunities to observe
and measure the effects of monopsony power, the behavior of cartels,
and the practice of price discrimination.
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Sports economics is also finding its way into the college classroom. Economists have found that sports is a useful medium for teaching economics, given the natural interest of many students in sports
issues. The use of economic principles to help students understand the
economic issues in sports provides evidence to students that learning
economics can be both useful and fun. Thus, a small but growing number of colleges and universities now offer courses on the economics of
sports.
The papers presented in this volume examine a number of contemporary economic issues in the world of sports. The lecture series that
produced these papers was held at Western Michigan University during
the 1998–1999 school year. The theme of the lecture series and this
volume—“Economics of Sports: Winners and Losers”—is, of course, a
play on words because it describes not only the results for the players
of the game, but also the issues that we hoped the papers would
explore. Though economists stress the desirability of outcomes that
will improve the position of everyone, we are also aware that is not
always the case. Indeed, many sports fans feel that they increasingly
have come out losers as ticket prices have risen and they feel alienated
from players who seem more interested in the money than the game.
Cities that are vying to attract or retain sports franchises believe they
will be winners in the game of urban development and job creation, but
is that really the case? In the aftermath of the recent labor management
struggles that have taken place in baseball and basketball, one wonders
whether either side won!
The volume begins with a paper by Rodney Fort on the consequences of monopoly in professional sports. He argues that much of
what sports fans complain about in pro sports—high ticket prices, high
player salaries, and public subsidies for stadium construction—are predictable consequences of the monopoly power wielded by professional
sports leagues. The monopoly power of sports leagues, he says, stems
from the special legal treatment which sports leagues have been
granted. The consequence of their special legal status is that leagues
can restrict the supply of sports franchises, manage themselves as cartels, and stifle competition from competing sports leagues. The answer
to this problem, Fort argues, is to apply a dose of competition to professional sports. He endorses a remedy for sports monopolies first
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offered by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll—breaking up pro sports
leagues into competing leagues.
One of the most hotly debated contemporary sports issues is the
use of tax dollars by cities attempting to attract and retain professional
sports franchises. Fort’s paper reveals that this practice is a consequence of the monopoly power wielded by sports leagues, whose supply of franchises is limited relative to cities’ demands. Thus, cities find
that a new stadium, paid for with tax dollars, is the price to retain or
attract a pro sports team. The stadium building boom also results from
the belief that sports franchises are “hotbeds” of urban development
that will generate jobs and growth. But is that really the case?
Professor Robert Baade is a pioneer in determining the impact of
sports teams and stadiums on regional economies. In previous studies,
Baade and others have found that the impact on regional growth and
employment was negligible at best. In the paper presented here, Baade
investigates the impact of sports facilities on neighborhood economies
as well as their urban renewal strategy. Cities are building stadiums in
the core city in an attempt to bring economic activity back to areas
abandoned during the last several decades as population and economic
activity have migrated to the suburbs. This has been a strategy followed by Cleveland, Atlanta, and Nashville where recently constructed
stadiums were placed near the central business district, and in Detroit,
where a new stadium for the Detroit Tigers was recently completed.
As a case study, Baade uses Seattle, which is constructing two new
stadiums for the Mariners and Seahawks in close proximity to its
former stadium, the Kingdome. Baade estimates the economic impact
that the Kingdome’s presence has had on the surrounding neighborhood, known as Pioneer Square.
If sports teams and new facilities generate negligible net increases
in regional economic activity, and if, as Baade contends, they also do
little to invigorate central business districts, then who are the primary
beneficiaries of the public subsidies to sports franchises? This issue is
addressed in the paper by John Siegfried and Timothy Peterson. They
point out that in discussing stadium construction and team relocation,
the public has focused on financing issues while economists have
largely focused on efficiency issues. However, the equity issue remains
largely unexamined. Siegfried and Peterson note that although some
have complained that publicly financed stadiums amount “to construct-
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ing playgrounds for the rich,” there is little objective evidence about
the income distribution effects of these projects. They propose to remedy this by considering who bears the burden of the costs of new stadium construction and who receives the benefits.
The underlying theme of both Richard Sheehan’s and Andrew
Zimbalist’s papers is the difficulty of maintaining competitive balance
in sports. Although fans’ enthusiasm is a function of the competitiveness of the leagues, gross mismatches in talent create dull contests
which are not in the long-run interest of the leagues. However, success
on the playing field is largely a result of a team’s ability to acquire the
most talented players and management’s ability to provide the best
facilities. Success is a function of the economic resources available to
the individual teams, and these resources are often grossly unequal.
Zimbalist points out that some teams in professional sports are located
in cities that are eight times larger than other cities in the league.
Major League Baseball is an obvious example of this problem. Smallmarket cities are finding it almost impossible to compete for talent with
teams located in large markets.
Richard Sheehan’s paper demonstrates that competitive balance is
an issue in collegiate sports. He shows that, in contrast to the popular
view of major collegiate sports, most college sports programs are not
profitable. He considers the connection between the abilities of sports
teams to generate revenues and their on-field success: in other words,
is it possible to buy victories? And, will winning more make a school’s
sports programs more profitable? Sheehan argues that athletic finances
and athletic success are intimately related. The ability to generate
large revenues raises the likelihood of winning. However, increased
winning often translates into small revenue gains. Sheehan thus argues
that the “have nots” of college athletics are not likely to join the
“haves” by investing in their college sports programs. A relatively
small number of sports programs generate large sums of money and
those programs perennially enjoy the bulk of on-field success.
Andrew Zimbalist’s paper discusses the economic issues involved
in the 1998–1999 NBA lockout. Zimbalist, who was a consultant to
the NBA Player’s Association during the negotiations, argues that there
are several strategies that leagues might employ to preserve competitive balance. These include revenue sharing, skewing the reverse order
of drafting of players to give poorer teams greater access to talent, arti-
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ficially restricting the growth of players’ salaries, and compelling
league divestiture to engender competition.
The NBA owners claimed that the salary-cap restrictions they
wished to impose were necessary to restore competitive balance by
ensuring the survival of financially weak teams, but Zimbalist argues
that this was mere rhetoric. Few, if any, teams were actually losing
money, and those that were would soon have new arenas and more revenue from television. In addition, the owners attempted in both 1995
and 1998 to eliminate the Larry Bird exception, which was a device
that helped to maintain competitive balance. The owners’ argument,
he concludes, was just cover for their attempt to raise profits by holding down the growth of salaries.
Zimbalist suggests that if the NBA owners are truly serious about
the competitive balance problem, they should pursue the NFL’s strategy of revenue sharing, but that faces serious obstacles in both basketball and baseball. The best solution, he argues, is one also suggested
by Fort: foster competition by breaking up the existing leagues and
creating new ones. With two leagues in each sport, large-market teams
would have to share their market with teams from the competing
leagues, and cities would not have to compete against one another by
offering new stadiums to attract teams.
The volume concludes with a paper by Lawrence Kahn surveying
the literature on the incidence of racial discrimination in pro sports
with respect to salaries, hiring, retention, positional segregation, and
customer prejudice. As Kahn points out, the world of sports has been a
particularly rich environment in which to study discrimination because
of the abundance of information related to player race, compensation,
and productivity. Kahn’s survey of the literature demonstrates that
although the extent of discrimination appears to have declined over
time, some evidence that discrimination in hiring, positional discrimination, and retention stemming from racial preferences of sports fans
still lingers.
The six essays presented here offer a wide perspective on current
issues in the field of sports economics from a group of scholars who
have made significant contributions to this emerging field. They
should certainly be worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the
impact of sports teams and stadiums on urban development and in the
attempts by professional and collegiate sports leagues to maintain
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competitive balance. We can only hope that some of the insights
offered here will ultimately come to bear upon the decisions that the
leagues and governments involved in these issues must make.

1
Market Power in Pro Sports
Problems and Solutions
Rodney Fort
Washington State University

Many Americans are completely carried away with sports. During
the last baseball strike in 1994, Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution (yes, there really is an economist with that famous baseball name)
tried to put sports into perspective during his testimony before Congress. He pointed out that while the Major League Baseball (MLB) as
an industry was just under $2 billion a year, the envelope industry
topped the $2 billion mark. In a slightly broader view, the cardboard
box industry generated well over triple that amount annually. He proceeded to lightly scold the subcommittee for spending its scarce and
valuable time on such small potatoes.
Watching this testimony on C-SPAN, I was (very briefly) ashamed.
After all, the importance with which I view sports is neatly summarized in one of my favorite Far Side cartoons. Artist Gary Larson
shows a group of primordial sea-dwellers just off shore. One of the
group holds a bat, and their baseball lies on the beach, just out of reach.
The caption reads, “Great Moments in Evolution.” The clear implication is that baseball is the reason we waddled out of the ooze in the first
place. And here before Congress was an economist of no small renown
pointing out that this inflated enthusiasm is over an industry that is
dwarfed by only a small share of the paper products industry.
But my shame faded when I remembered that there is no cardboard
box page in the daily paper. And it never has been the case that massive public subsidies for cardboard box companies have been on a referendum ballot. Sports really are different than cardboard boxes.
Many of us enjoy benefits from sports that are vastly beyond what we
spend on them. Whole other media industries thrive on its output, and
it can be a consuming passion, this love of sports shared by so many. I
think I might mail a copy of that Far Side cartoon to Professor Aaron.
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This depth of feeling generates the concern of so many fans over
the current state of pro sports. Talk to any sports fan and you will get
at least one of the following opinions. Rising ticket prices threaten to
slam the door on the average fan. Growing revenue imbalance leaves
most teams out of contention before the season even starts. Stratospheric player salaries make it impossible to identify with players and
introduces skepticism about whether or not they really lay it on the line
every play. And do not even get a fan started about labor-management
relations! MLB fans have recently lost their play-offs and a World
Series because of them, and National Basketball Association (NBA)
fans just lost half a season to labor unrest.
All of these outcomes are for the fans lucky enough to have a team.
Many other fans have spent what seems an eternity waiting for an
expansion team to arrive in their area. Others have seen their existing
team threaten relocation at the drop of a hat. Team owners put all-ornothing demands on their host cities and balk at every hint of intrusion
into the power they wield over their sport. No other industry in the
United States has such control over 1) exclusive geographical franchise
rights over the entire industry, 2) team movement and location, 3) gate
and TV revenue sharing, 4) TV contracts as a joint venture, and 5)
entering talent through rookie drafts.
In the midst of all this unrest, you’ll find economists nosing
around. In our book, Hardball (1999), James Quirk and I organize the
questions surrounding this fan frustration into a few chapters. Are the
media and big TV money to blame? Is it player unions? Owners?
Sports leagues? State and local politicians? Or what? As you can
probably guess, we point our finger at “or what,” which we define as
market power.
Almost all economists see the ultimate culprit as market power,
which derives from the special legal treatment of leagues. The outcomes are exclusive franchise rights for teams, management of sports
leagues as cartels, and a complete stifling of any competing leagues,
precisely those indicated by the basic economic theory of market
power. In what follows, I will run through this logic and suggest what
can be done about these outcomes.
Not much of what I am presenting here is new. Many of the issues
were raised during the Federal Baseball decision of 1922, MLB’s socalled antitrust exemption, enjoying its 75th anniversary this year.
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Since that time, nearly all of these issues have been raised repeatedly in
Congressional hearings that date back to 1951 and that represent at
least 49 years of Congressional scrutiny. The ameliorative device proposed here also is not new. I found it first voiced in Congressional testimony by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll in 1976. The problem is longstanding and one can only marvel that the current market power structure of sports leagues has withstood this scrutiny for so many years.

MARKET POWER PROBLEMS IN PRO SPORTS
Before proceeding to the heart of the matter—namely, market
power—let us examine the more well-publicized culprits. Many claim
that the media and big TV money cause most of the economic problems in sports. But the media are nothing more than a pipeline for
advertising revenues, transporting them from advertisers, through
broadcasters, and on to sports leagues and teams. There can be little
doubt that the game on the field or floor is different because of television; there wouldn’t be much point to on-field celebrations or taunting
without an audience. But to networks, sports are just another type of
programming that reaches particular demographic groups of interest to
their advertisers. And, given that leagues can confront a small number
of bidders with a chance at the rights to these important properties, it
should come as no surprise that the bulk of the proceeds moves to the
leagues and their teams. And this happens because leagues are allowed
to act jointly in the sale of their TV rights, a practice that surely would
be outlawed in any other industry.
Sportswriters are especially fond of making unions one of the
major culprits in pro sports. Unions have no doubt changed the face of
professional sports by removing nearly all of the mechanisms that
owners previously used to restrict the free movement of players
between teams. The result is that players now receive salaries much
closer to the value of their contribution to team revenues. Some fans
might begrudge players their huge salaries, but the money that fans
spend on sports will not go away. If players don’t get the money, then
owners will keep it. In no small way, salaries are large because leagues
earn more than the normal rate of return; it is the monopoly profit
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earned by leagues that is up for grabs in player–owner negotiations.
Because players are free to move between teams without this profit,
there wouldn’t be much for a union to negotiate except minimum salaries and benefit packages. In summary, unions have not created the
fabulous wealth available to athletes; they have just been proficient at
moving that wealth from owners to players.
What about the players, themselves? Is their insatiable greed at
least partly to blame for rising ticket prices? There is both a contradiction and a fundamental economic misunderstanding behind this view.
First, for the interesting contradiction, why do fans think that players
are any greedier than anybody else, including themselves? How many
fans would be willing to take less than they could possibly make? Second, for the economic misunderstanding, sports salaries simply reflect
the value that fans place on player talent. Player salaries are not the
cause of high ticket prices or the rise of pay-per-view televised games.
Instead, it is the willingness of fans to pay ever more for sports that
raises player salaries and encourages owners to seek new avenues of
collection like pay-per-view. Players are no more to blame for the high
price of sports than movie stars are to blame for the rising price of
movie tickets. According to economic theory, it is demand that drives
the result. Besides, if players didn’t take their share, would anybody
reasonably suggest that owners would rebate the balance to fans?
So, it is not the media, or unions, or players who are responsible
for market power problems. However, the source of the problem
plaguing pro sports comes to light when we examine owners and their
behavior together as a sports league. At the most basic economic level,
owners possess the rights to a very valuable monopoly. That monopoly
is granted by pro sports leagues, in plain view for all to see. Because
leagues are allowed to behave like cartels in controlling inputs and outputs, individual teams in these leagues confront no current or future
competition from rivals. The result for fans in this setting has been
clear since the time of Adam Smith-restricted output, prices greater
than marginal cost, and profits greater than the normal rate of return.
Thus, it is not the personalities of owners that cause the economic
problems in pro sports; it is in fact the leagues, which operate as one of
the most successful monopolies in history.
That leaves politicians. Typically, when market power runs wild,
we hope for political intervention to protect consumers, but, if any-
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thing, politicians have facilitated sports monopolies. First, despite the
open invitation by Justice Holmes in his Federal Baseball decision,
Congress has never intervened to define the antitrust status of MLB.
Second, pro sports league mergers have been encouraged by Congress
rather than denied. Finally, specific laws enacted by Congress, from
local black-out laws to joint venture sale of TV rights, have served to
cement the monopoly power of leagues. And it doesn’t get any better
at the local level. Witness the stadium mess plaguing so many current
pro sports team hosts.
So, there you have it. Ticket prices are high because there are no
competing teams in the same geographic market to push prices to marginal cost. Competitive balance is lacking because leagues restrict the
number of teams in large revenue markets to the advantage of all
league members. Salaries are higher than they would be under competition because some of the rents from market power accrue to players in
a labor market that is carefully managed by unions. Strikes and lockouts occur as owners and players lock horns over the division of
monopoly profits. Because leagues carefully manage the number of
teams, output is restricted and prices rise, and some cities are purposely held open to solidify threats of relocation against current host
cities. On the other hand, host cities are confronted with these all-ornothing propositions because the careful management of alternatives
by pro sports leagues has resulted in a lack of substitutes for professional sports teams. All this has occurred because market power has
been allowed to dominate in pro sports.
Make no mistake about it. The value of market power in pro sports
is high. When an owner buys a team, the price includes rights that are
valuable beyond control of capital and a player roster. The new owner
buys a monopoly right to provide the only game in a specific location as
a member of the league. This right yields 1) gate, stadium, and local TV
revenues; 2) any revenues that can be extracted from players; 3) special
tax treatment; 4) a share of league-wide, national TV contract revenues;
5) a share of league earnings from expansion fees; and 6) spill-over benefits to other business enterprises of the team owner. In Los Angeles, the
value of these rights recently was revealed at around $300 million during the sale of the Dodgers in 1998. In Cleveland, it was $530 million
for the Browns in 1998. Abroad, it was nearly a $1 billion offer for the
Manchester United soccer team in 1999.
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There isn’t any mystery about the remedy: a stiff dose of competition. However, this kind of economic competition is repulsive to owners and league personnel. National Football League (NFL)
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue has been quoted as follows (Sports Illustrated, September 16, 1996), “Free market economics is the process of
driving enterprises out of business. Sports league economics is the
process of keeping enterprises in business.” Quite aside from inventing
a brand new term, sports league economics, the self-serving nature of
the statement is only barely veiled. Before proceeding to a prescription
for what ails pro sports, let us examine just what we would expect from
a good stiff dose of competition.

ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE SPORTS LEAGUES
As Walter Neale (1964) pointed out long ago, the economics of
sports indeed is peculiar. Cooperation is essential for the survival of
sports leagues. They must cooperate in order to determine a schedule
and a common set of rules and their enforcement. Appeals are essential, so some sort of cooperative central decisions are necessary. And,
finally, leagues may need to cooperate to determine championship formats. But no one expects this cooperation to result in a restriction of
output and prices exceeding marginal cost. That sort of cooperation is
no more justified in pro sports than it is in any other economic
endeavor.
Economic competition would tip the economic scales away from
owners and players and toward fans and taxpayers. First, think about
TV. Competition among leagues would eliminate monopoly profits
from national TV contracts. Because a monopoly league can maximize TV revenues by restricting the number of games shown, introducing competition would result in more televised games. This would
reduce the value of game broadcasts to advertisers because competition
acts to bid away the profits earned from market power. Similarly, local
TV revenue would decrease. Local broadcasters would go with the
cheapest team of equal quality in their area. And the same argument
applies to gate receipts. If fans could find substitute teams of equal
quality, they would go with the one that charged least.

The Economics of Sports

13

The impact of competition on player salaries is more difficult to
determine. Players would no longer contribute to an economic activity
that earned more than a normal return; therefore, players would be
worth less. A further decline in player salaries would be expected from
competition. Charles Finley, former owner of the Oakland Athletics,
knew this well. He responded to player demands for free agency in the
mid 1970s with a hoot. He suggested that MLB embrace this idea
whole-heartedly because competition would kill the rising union tide
and, along with it, salary arbitration and other artificial mechanisms
propping up salaries. If competition removed sports unions from the
picture, wages would fall even further. But there would be an important, off-setting factor. If leagues became truly and legally competitive, other restrictions on player earnings would not be expected to
survive. For example, a rookie draft would wither away with the introduction of competition; this sort of restriction would not stand up to
raiding by rival leagues. Thus, players in a competitive situation would
be worth less than they had been under monopoly; and if their ability to
organize were dealt a death blow as well, then their salaries might
decrease further. But, this decline would be partly offset when other
restrictions on earnings withered away under competition.
And while we are on the topic, most labor-management strife
would disappear with competition because the major source of strife,
monopoly profits, would be gone. Unions might still try raising pay
for some players, which, in a competitive environment, would only
increase owner costs and reduce overall player employment, but this
behavior would be up to the union members themselves. The union
focus might shift to pensions and other fringe benefits. And the
already contentious issue of income distribution between superstars
and journeyman players would increase.
Perhaps the most dramatic impacts of competition would occur in
expansion and relocation. Under competition, all financially viable
locations would have a team from one league or another. This would
probably increase the number of teams in megalopolis markets and
fans in these locations would enjoy more professional sports; but there
would be a downside for other fans. Because gate and TV revenues
would be lower, current marginal locations might become unprofitable.
As always, with changes in market structure, there would be distribu-
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tional consequences. Here, the trade-off would appear to be between
the fans of marginal teams in a few cities and fans in larger areas.
State and local taxpayers also would feel the impact of competition
on expansion and relocation. Because all viable locations would have
a team, team owners would not be able to make threats about leaving
their current host cities. In fact, the tables would take a dramatic turn:
teams actually would compete for financially viable locations. If one
team pushed its host too far, another team would be waiting in the
wings for a lower subsidy. Competition should reduce subsidies to
teams and possibly even put a market rental rate on existing and future
publicly owned stadiums.
So, in a competitive economic environment, there would be more
teams in big cities and a team in all economically viable locations. Cities would provide much lower subsidies, if any, in the form of extravagant stadiums and sweetheart stadium deals. The stadium mess would
be alleviated. There would be more games on television, lower revenue to teams from television contracts, and lower ticket prices. Player
salaries could either fall or rise, depending on the relative impacts of a
few obvious labor market factors. Team profits would fall and franchise values along with them. In effect, power would be shifted from
players and owners to fans and taxpayers. Some fans would enjoy
more sports, while others would lose their team if it was just hanging
on in the first place.
But economic competition has its limits, which must be considered
when prescribing a remedy to the problem of market power in pro
sports. First, there have been competitive leagues in the past, but the
tendency has always been back toward a single, monopoly league.
Economic competition has not been self-sustaining in pro sports, historically. Owners in rival leagues would ultimately see the value in reforming another monopoly; therefore, something more than just setting
the wheels of competition in motion would be required to create
change.
Another nuance to pro sports leagues also dictates caution in the
prescription for market power. Existing leagues have already established their reputations and created a strong sense of fan identification.
These teams suffered low or negative profits during their early years of
growth and have paid public relations expenditures since that time.
The returns on such an investment are the monopoly profits earned by
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these sports teams under their current league structures, and these
returns have been earned for quite some time. A rival league planning
to compete with existing leagues would have to make the same kind of
investment, in addition to competing for talent to demonstrate that they
really were an enduring, big-league alternative. This effort would be
required in order to encourage fans and the media to commit their loyalties to their new league. But, if competition were enforced from the
very outset for the new rival, the league would not be able to recover
these costs. So, competition would not sustain itself, and it must be
sustained externally in a very careful manner in order to nurture a rival.
In addition to the economic circumstances described so far, politics
also impede economic competition in pro sports. As even the most
casual student of government and the sports business knows, choices
by elected officials often facilitate, rather than ameliorate, market
power. Congress has failed to respond to the MLB antitrust court decision of 1922. In 1962, it exempted league-wide TV contracts in all
sports from antitrust laws. Congress exempted the American Football
League (AFL)–NFL merger from antitrust laws in 1966 and brought
pressure to bear on the NBA to merge with the American Basketball
Association (ABA) in the mid 1970s. Congress also has allowed other
leagues to exercise veto power over the location of their teams. Now,
leagues put teams where they want them and carefully control the most
lucrative markets. Thus, despite repeated investigation, Congressional
action has consistently enhanced monopoly power in sports, and state
and local government outcomes have given us the stadium mess confronting so many current and prospective host cities.

CREATING ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE
SPORTS LEAGUES
In summary, competition stands a better than decent chance of
eliminating the ills in pro sports. But competition will not be self-sustaining, and in sustaining competition, one must exercise caution.
Generating fan loyalty and staying power would be an expensive proposition for any new, competing league. Some long-term return would
be required to make such an investment pay. An assurance of return
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would mean that special antitrust accommodations would be required
because overzealous enforcement of competition would kill that return
and the hope for competitive leagues. Finally, there is no reason to
expect that federal, state, or local politicians would embrace a more
economically competitive setting for pro sports. Politicians pursue
reelection. Currently, that pursuit appears to favor the current market
power status of leagues and we should not expect any change until
politically potent opposition appears. A few voices crying in the wilderness is not enough.
For all but its political limitations, one plan would work. Suppose
an existing league were simply broken up into competing leagues. The
foundation is there already. The American and National leagues in
baseball would be economically competitive if they were not under
unified, cartel management by MLB. Indeed, prior to 1901, the two
were, by and large, economic competitors! Essentially the same thing
is true of the NFL. The American Football Conference (AFC) and the
National Football Conference (NFC), with only a few cross-over
teams, are precisely the most recent version of the AFL and the earlier
NFL prior to the merger in 1969. The same would be true of the NBA
and the National Hockey League (NHL). A breakup could restore
much of the same competition that existed prior to their mergers with
the ABA and the World Hockey Association (WHA), respectively.
Therefore, a breakup of existing leagues could potentially create competing leagues.
But, again, one would not expect this situation to last on its own.
Enforcement of these breakups under existing antitrust laws would be
required for competition to flourish. If leagues tried to regroup and
merge, antitrust enforcement should preclude their forming new cartels. Perhaps the most important element of a breakup/antitrust
enforcement approach is that it would allow the resulting, competing
leagues to retain the fan loyalty and media ties that they had cultivated
over the years. The new leagues already are “major” in every sense of
the word. And they wouldn’t lose the fan identification that they have
cultivated over the years. Interestingly though, one would expect that
expenditures aimed at maintaining this loyalty would fall over time.
The reason? The return on such investments would be falling under a
competitive structure.
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Of course, any movement away from monopoly would affect the
welfare of leagues, players, fans, and taxpayers. Owners and players
could be characterized as losers because their welfare will fall. Overall, fans would be winners because they would enjoy sports at lower
prices, and taxpayers would win because subsidies would be reduced.
However, some fans at locations with marginal teams might lose
because competition would drive marginal teams out of business or to
other locations.
One of the usual questions posed at this point is “What would be
the quality of competition on the field with increased economic competition?” A long-standing “invariance principle,” attributable to Simon
Rottenberg (1956), suggests that quality will stay at its current level.
After all, all of the earnings over and above the competitive rate were
pure economic rents. Because the changes projected here would occur
league-wide, players and coaches would face diminished opportunities
wherever they turned in their sport. And their nonsport alternative
would not have gotten any better. Would players play for less and
coaches coach for less, rather than leave their sport? Almost certainly.
Although the level of competition, while probably still unbalanced
across a given league, would not be expected to decline.
Perhaps the minor leagues (baseball, basketball, and hockey) and
college football, which operate at the same time and often in the same
vicinity as major league teams, might prove instructive on the quality
issue. Because economic competition would yield a different number
and mix of teams of major league caliber, with more of them located in
the largest cities, perhaps there would be a more continuous quality
gradient between the current minor leagues and college conferences
and the major leagues. Among the minor leagues and college teams,
size and drawing power are similar to the determinants that would
drive a competitive pro league structure.
But the nagging question is just how in the world will this ever
happen. This idea of breaking up the major leagues dates back to Congressional testimony in 1976 by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll, and still
there has been no political action. This inaction is cause for pessimism
among those interested in fixing the problems of market power confronting sports fans. However, market power and its consequences in
pro sports must be good for politicians because it has been the norm for
almost 100 years.
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The environmental movement offers instructive lessons in changing the political status quo. When a problem becomes important
enough to voters, they become politically mobilized. It is an expensive
and laborious process. Those bent on such change must successfully
accomplish an overwhelming educational mission. They must also
overcome the high costs and free-riding behavior associated with organizing a politically potent group. After all of that, they face the dogeat-dog world of advocate politics. Small wonder that market power
has ruled in pro sports given the obstacles to bringing it down.
But maybe the times are changing. On the Internet, many fan
advocate and alternative ownership arrangement pages have begun to
appear; and the Internet dramatically reduces the costs of forming
organizations. Further, while Major League Baseball appears to be
rebounding from the strike of 1994, it could well be an illusory return
driven mostly by the “Mark and Sammy Home Run Show.” Dramatic
revenue dispersion remains a source of tension between owners, and
any additional interruption of play could bring down the wrath of fans.
This wrath, however, might be a prerequisite to forming a politically
potent interest group aimed at eliminating the market power in pro
sports. Perhaps this organization might begin with the NBA, which is
in turmoil. Their fans just lost half a season and are getting a weak
imitation of the usual level of NBA play. If NBA fan interest groups
rise to change the current local reelection margin, they may remedy the
problem. For that is surely the only real solution. I hope I have made it
clear that the culprit is market power. The rest is up to the fans, who,
after all, are the source of nearly all of the profit in the first place.
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The Impact of Sports Teams and
Facilities on Neighborhood
Economies: What is the Score?
Robert A. Baade
Lake Forest College

INTRODUCTION
Among the noteworthy twentieth century trends identified for the
United States has been the movement of people and economic activity
from urban centers to the suburbs. Business has followed the migration of its labor force, and as a consequence most American city centers have deteriorated economically and socially in the latter years of
this century. This urban economic malaise was further exacerbated in
the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan’s vision of a nation less dependent on a federal government. One manifestation of Reagan’s emphasis on greater state autonomy was reduced federal revenue sharing. A
less generous federal government translated into more parsimonious
state governments, and, following the dollar food chain, less financial
support for local governments. The erosion of the urban economic
base compelled new economic strategies for cities, and mayors have
responded by devising policies that emphasize the urban core as a cultural destination. Mayors hope that their cultural entrepreneurship will
reverse the decades-old flow of people and money from city centers
and serve to reestablish them as the hubs of American life. One aspect
of this strategy has been the aggressive attempt by the mayors of many
large cities to relocate professional sports stadiums from the suburbs to
the central business districts (CBDs). The purpose of this study is to
use the city of Seattle as a case study through which to analyze the
prospects for improving economic performance in city centers by relocating stadiums used for professional sports to the CBD.
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In addressing this issue, it is important to establish first the incidence of stadium migration from the suburbs back to the city center
and to discuss the reasons for this development. In the next section of
this study, the hypothesized microeconomic impact is contrasted with
the macroeconomic or metropolitan impact. Scholars have studied the
macroeconomic impact sufficiently so that reliable evidence is available on the influence professional sports have exerted on metropolitan
areas. There are reasons, however, to expect that in terms of both magnitude and pattern, economic development at the local level may differ
from that characterizing the metropolis. The next portion of the paper
is devoted to discussing Seattle’s use as a representative sample for
exploring the likely economic impact of CBD relocation. Essential to
this task is a brief discussion of Seattle’s recent stadium history from
the construction of the Kingdome to the present. The economic effect
the Kingdome has had on the Pioneer Square Neighborhood, that portion of Seattle that borders the Kingdome on the West and North, is
portrayed in the paper’s next section. Critical to this analysis is a business survey largely conducted at the end of June 1998. Conclusions
and policy implications are offered in the paper’s final part.

STADIUM MIGRATION—BACK TO THE FUTURE
Earlier in the 20th century, stadiums were woven into dense urban
fabrics. Rather than the stadium defining and shaping an area, the stadium was viewed as subordinate to a larger urban design and function.
The existing city grid established the shape and location of many urban
ballparks lending an idiosyncratic character to many of them. For
example the Baker Bowl, home to the Major League Baseball’s Philadelphia Phillies until 1938, was also known as “Hump” because it was
built on an elevated piece of ground to accommodate a railroad tunnel
running under centerfield (Lowry 1992). Today only Fenway Park in
Boston (1912) with its legendary “Green Monster” and Wrigley Field
in Chicago (1914) stand as representative monuments to past urban
imperatives. Tiger Stadium in Detroit (1912) was recently replaced by
a new ballpark, and discussions are under way to replace both Fenway
Park and Wrigley Field.
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In the post–World War II era, a rapidly expanding economy
increased the personal incomes of most Americans to a point where
former luxuries such as automobiles and houses outside crowded cities
could be purchased by a majority of the population. As areas on the
city’s periphery were settled, businesses followed in part to capitalize
on emerging markets for consumer goods and to gain proximity to the
labor force. In keeping with this suburban trend, stadiums followed the
fans. Expressways were built to accommodate the automobile, and
suburban stadiums were located in close proximity to expressways to
facilitate fan travel to the ballpark. Automobiles required space, and
the typical suburban ballpark was surrounded by a sea of asphalt. The
homes of most fans in the post–World War II era were connected to the
ballpark by a seamless stream of concrete.
Accommodating the automobile came at a price from the perspective of the neighborhood in which the stadium was located. Easing
entry and egress to the stadium mitigated the spillover of pedestrian
traffic and economic activity into the environs where the ballpark was
located. On the way from the stadium to their automobiles, fans
encountered car windows not store windows. Once in their cars, the
strong current of the expressways did not allow easy contact with commercial entities along the way. Any commerce that did occur in conjunction with sports spectating likely did so within the confines of the
ballpark unless excursions into the neighborhood or elsewhere were
planned.
Professional sports has been undergoing an economic revolution
inspired by a confluence of circumstances both inside and outside the
professional sports industry. These changes have affected both the
supply and demand for professional sports, which, in turn, have had
implications for where and how professional sporting events are packaged and presented. Nowhere are these changes more apparent than in
the design and location of stadiums and arenas. Financial imperatives
have worked to all but eliminate the multipurpose, circular stadium
(the “ashtrays”) built a few decades ago in cities such as Cincinnati,
Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia to host both football and baseball. In
addition, financial forces have reversed the trend toward locating ballparks in suburban areas with vast tracts of land suitable for inexpensive
parking. Stadiums and arenas are coming back to the cities with promises of fan spending spilling over into the commercial corridors of the
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neighborhoods through which fans flow to reach transportation centers
or remote parking lots.
Cities have used this promise of increased economic activity to
persuade citizens to lend financial support to an aggressive city strategy to remake their centers into cultural destinations. For example, to
lure people back to the downtown, Cleveland has developed the Gateway complex, which serves as a home to the Major League Baseball
(MLB) Indians (Jacobs Field) and the National Basketball Association
(NBA) Cavaliers (Gund Arena) along with the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame. Atlanta, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Nashville,
to name but a few, are other cities that have opted for placing stadiums
in or near the central business district (CBD) in an effort to help revitalize them. Stadium construction in the National Football League
(NFL) symbolizes the return to downtown or near downtown locations.
Barring unforeseen construction delays, 13 new stadiums will have
been built in the 1990s. Of those, only facilities in Jacksonville (the
renovation was of a scope sufficient to warrant it new), San Francisco,
Tampa Bay, and Maryland (Washington Redskins) are located outside
of what could be considered the CBD or CBD fringe. Approximately
60 percent of the NFL stadiums were located in or near CBDs prior to
the 1990s, or about 16 percent less than characterize current construction trends. If the events conducted at the stadiums attract people from
beyond the metropolitan areas in which they are located, then those
who support public subsidies for these facilities promise that metropolitan, state, and regional economies will benefit from such investments.
Do metropolitan economies derive a boost from professional sports
and their stadiums? If they do, then surely the neighborhood in which
the stadium is located is the recipient of those benefits. In the next portion of the paper, an assessment of the benefits accruing to the metropolis from professional sports teams and stadiums is analyzed.

TEAMS, STADIUMS, AND METROPOLITAN
ECONOMIC IMPACT
The experience of a cross-section of cities across the United States
over the past few decades strongly disputes the claim that professional
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sports teams and stadiums provide an economic boost for metropolises.
Baade (1996) found no correlation between the real growth differential
in real per capita personal income for a city experiencing some change
in its professional sports industry and cities experiencing no such
change or having no professional sports presence. Baade’s analysis
included all cities hosting a team in one of the four major professional
sports (baseball, basketball, football, and hockey), and covered more
than three decades of observations beginning in 1958. All else equal,
one would expect a professional sports host city to expand economically if sports does attract more than local interest and dollars. The fact
that evidence fails to support such a contention requires an explanation
and several come immediately to mind.
First, the professional sports team may simply be too small to
influence in any meaningful way a large, diverse metropolitan economy. For example, in litigation regarding the constitutionality of using
several hundred million dollars of public funds for subsidizing a new
stadium for the NFL’s Tampa Bay Buccaneers to replace a 20-year-old
facility, the author testified as an expert representing those opposed to
public subventions that the team’s revenues ranked below more than 70
other enterprises in that city. In using an academic context to provide
perspective, Noll and Zimbalist (1997, p. 57) observed that the top ten
universities in the United States received $2.8 billion in federal grant
money in 1994, which was more than the combined revenue of the
NFL and National Hockey League (NHL) or the combined revenue of
MLB and the NBA for that year.
Second, and perhaps more important, consonant with elementary
budget constraints, spending on professional sports spectating substitutes for time and money that could be spent on other goods or services. To the extent that the fan base is largely indigenous to the
metropolitan area, net spending in the metropolitan area may increase,
decrease, or stay constant even though gross spending on sports
increases significantly. The distinction between gross and net spending
changes is pivotal in precisely estimating the impact of professional
sports. Some economic impact studies supporting stadium subsidies
use a gross measure of spending that occurs in conjunction with professional sports. They then purport to capture the indirect impact
through “multiplier analysis.”1 A measure of net spending changes, of
course, requires substantially more data or more sophisticated model-
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ing and accounts in part for the use of estimates of gross spending to
defend stadium subsidies. Given the paucity of data and the complex
web of financial inflows and outflows that occur as a consequence of
hosting a professional sports team, a reasonable estimate of the team’s
economic contribution likely can be rendered only through comparing
the metropolitan economic landscape before and after the team or stadium. This after-the-fact audit in estimating the economic impact of
professional sports has been favored by some economists (Noll and
Zimbalist 1997; Baade and Sanderson 1997; Hamilton and Kahn 1997;
Austrian and Rosentraub 1997).
Estimates on gross and net new spending differ substantially. For
example, in a report estimating the economic impact of the Seattle
Mariners on the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Washington prepared by Dick Conway & Associates for King County in 1994,
net direct spending as a percentage of gross direct spending was identified as 44.3 percent for the city and county ($40.4 million/$114.0 million for both the city and the state) and 32 percent ($29.1 million/
$114.0) for the state (Conway and Byers 1994). The difference
between gross and net total direct economic impact are more pronounced because multipliers will compound differences in gross and
net measures of direct economic impacts. Total net economic impact
as a percentage of total gross economic impact as calculated by Conway & Associates was 23.9 percent ($42.9 million/$179.7 million),
38.5 percent ($53.3 million/$138.8 million), and 40.1 percent ($47.7
million/$119.1 million) for the state, county, and city, respectively.
In relative terms, gross economic impact is likely to be most pronounced in the neighborhood in which the stadium is located. In measuring the impact professional sports has on economies, a circle could
be drawn from the point where the event actually occurs, and it could
be argued reasonably that the magnitude of the impact, in relative
terms at least, varies inversely with the size of the circle. Stated somewhat differently, the economic effect is thought to be most pronounced
at “ground-zero,” the exact location of the event. As the circumference
of the circle expands, the net impact diminishes as the dollars spent on
the sporting event are more completely offset by reduced spending
elsewhere. Following this budgetary logic as it relates to leisure spending, the global impact of even the largest sporting events such as the
Summer Olympics approximates zero if an increase in global net
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spending is not induced by the event itself. This is true because even
those who come from great distances spend time and money at the
Olympics in lieu of time and money they would have spent elsewhere.
The impact locally, therefore, depends on the extent to which spending
and respending occurs by those residing outside the environs where the
event is held, or by local citizens who spend money on the sports event
as opposed to spending discretionary income outside their neighborhood. Theoretically, a local government might decide to subsidize
sports if the audience is distinctly nonlocal. In the case of Seattle, Pioneer Square (the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located)
might be given an economic boost if those who view the professional
sports events hosted by the stadium are either living outside the community or are residents who would spend discretionary dollars outside
Pioneer Square. Within the neighborhood, there are outflows associated with team and stadium activities, and so even at the local level,
professional sports might fail to provide much of an economic boost.
Later in this chapter, I assess the economic impact the Kingdome has
had on Pioneer Square. First, however, it is appropriate to identify why
Seattle is worthy of study.

WHY SEATTLE?
Seattle typifies the contemporary economic relationship that U.S.
cities hosting major league sports have with their teams, particularly as
it relates to stadiums. In less than two decades after its construction,
owners of the NFL Seahawks and the MLB Mariners declared the
Kingdome economically obsolete. In their opinion, the Kingdome
could not compete financially with the new breed of stadiums being
built across the country. In citing a general shortcoming of multipurpose stadiums, the Kingdome’s critics argued that it failed to provide
an environment that encouraged fans to return because it compromised
sight lines for individual sports and otherwise reduced the ambiance
associated with single-sport structures, e.g., Wrigley Field in Chicago.
Most important, however, was the relative paucity of luxury seating and other revenue-generating amenities that the owners argued
placed their teams at a distinct financial disadvantage. Failure to com-
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pete financially limited their ability to compete for free-agent talent
and all but assured mediocrity on the playing field, which would further erode the team’s financial standing. Echoing this well-rehearsed
line, the owners contended that Seattle’s parsimony gave them no
choice but to consider the offers of other suitor cities throughout the
United States. The price to Washingtonians to keep the teams would
be steep: separate stadiums for the Seahawks and Mariners outfitted
with state-of-the-art amenities, including a retractable dome for the
Mariners’ facility. Even though a majority of the citizens of Seattle
voted “no” in a referendum to build a stadium for the Mariners, new
stadiums are now under construction for the Mariners and Seahawks.
The cost for both facilities will likely eclipse $700 million.
The apparatus of persuasion employed in trying to convince the
people of Seattle that this was not an egregious example of corporate
welfare included the claim that the stadiums should be considered
investments. As such, boosters noted that the facilities did not force
painful civic tradeoffs such as financial neglect of schools, streets, and
sewers but would instead generate a stream of revenues that could be
invested in many forms of public infrastructure. Owners, players, and
fans would not be the only winners, apologists for the stadiums
claimed, citizens of the metropolis and state would benefit as well.
The economic impact studies commissioned by new stadium proponents typically identify thousands of new jobs, more than $100 million
of economic impact, and substantial increases in tax revenues at all levels of government as the outcome of spending on a professional sports
team (Conway and Byers 1994). In opposition to these data, and as
noted in the previous section, other scholarly studies have debunked
the myth of sports serving as significant catalysts for metropolitan economic development. However, the claim that substantial local or
neighborhood economic development occurs endures. What has been
the experience of the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located?
What are the magnitude and pattern of local economic development
inspired by the Kingdome, and what will the new stadiums do for the
environs in which they are located? The next portion of the paper
addresses these questions.
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THE KINGDOME AND LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
The now-razed Kingdome and site for the two new stadiums is bordered on the north and west by Pioneer Square, a neighborhood of historical significance and of a mixed commercial and residential
character. Pioneer Square covers a 90-acre area roughly demarcated
by Cherry and Marion Streets on the north, 2nd and 3rd Streets on the
East, the Alaskan Way and the waterfront on the west, and Royal
Brougham Street on the south. Figures 1 and 2 show the location of
Pioneer Square, including the Kingdome. Because the stadiums that
will replace the Kingdome are under construction just south of it, this
map can be used to provide a reference for placing the new stadiums in
Seattle.
Pioneer Square exhibits significant diversity with respect to its
inhabitants and business enterprises. Missions for the homeless and
condominiums for city officials exist within blocks of one another.
There are 849 housing units in Pioneer Square and roughly 1,200 fulltime residents. This low ratio of residents to housing units is explained
in part by the high number of units that are identified as single room
occupancy (SROs). In addition to this low income housing, there are
737 shelter beds, but those who occupy them are not considered fulltime residents. There are 600 businesses in the business improvement
area (BIA) of Pioneer Square. Sports bars and jazz clubs share street
space with art galleries and a store that has provided leather goods for
more than a century for people who use horses for more than entertainment. Fifteen surface parking lots and six parking garages provide for
the parking needs of residents, workers, and visitors to the neighborhood. The skeletal structures of the new stadiums are rising in what
used to be the far southern parking lot serving the Kingdome. Prior to
the construction of the new stadiums, the Kingdome parking lots provided space for approximately 3,600 cars. 2 The Kingdome seated
66,400 people for football, and even at the conservative ratio of one
parking space for every four fans, when the stadium was filled to
capacity, 16,600 parking spaces were required. This stadium parking
shortfall had substantial implications for the neighborhood. Parking
issues will be discussed extensively in the next section of the paper.

Figure 1 Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area
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SOURCE: The Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area; used with permission.
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Figure 2 Seattle Neighborhoods
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Map courtesy of WHERE Seattle magazine and Northwest Visitors Publications, LLC., 113 First
Avenue N., #200, Seattle, WA 98109, est. 2000.
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The decision to raze the Kingdome was based in large part on the need
to provide parking for the patrons of the new stadiums.
The Kingdome originally cost $69 million. It underwent two renovations in the 1990s. One of the renovations centered on structural
problems relating to falling ceiling tiles, and the other concentrated on
shoring up a foundation that ostensibly made the facility vulnerable to
earthquakes. The cost of these two corrective projects exceeded the
$69 million spent to build the Kingdome. The price for the new stadiums has not been determined because cost overruns are already materializing. As mentioned previously, the price for both of them will very
likely exceed $700 million. Boosters justify these substantial investments in stadium infrastructure to residents of the Pioneer Square
neighborhood, the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Washington. They note how the substantial amount of economic activity
directly and indirectly related to the Kingdome will benefit all Washingtonians. As noted previously, ample empirical evidence negates the
notion that these sizeable investments will positively affect the Seattle
metropolitan and state of Washington economies. The question
remains, however, did the Pioneer Square neighborhood benefit on balance from having the Kingdome in its backyard? And what does the
answer imply about the impact of the new stadiums?
Based on the demographic characteristics, Pioneer Square has relatively few full-time residents with the financial wherewithal to buy
tickets to professional sporting events. It follows that the sports events
hosted by the Kingdome attracted the majority of their fans from outside Pioneer Square. If the spending that occurred in conjunction with
sports remained in the Pioneer Square economy, the local financial
boost provided by the stadium would have been substantial. The key,
of course, is the extent to which the money spent by nonlocal fans was
locally retained and spent again and again in the neighborhood. Those
who assert that the Kingdome provided a substantial economic boost
for Pioneer Square likely focused their attention on the financial
inflows only. Casual empiricism supports the assertion that the Kingdome represented a boon to Pioneer Square. On event days, fans
streamed into the stadium and the environs and spent large amounts of
money. A precise rendering of the economic impact, however, requires
not only an accurate measure of the dollars spent on sports spectating
and related activities, but a thorough identification of the money out-
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flows that occurred as a consequence of Kingdome events as well. The
financial leakages from the neighborhood economy may well have
been substantial, and can be broadly categorized as 1) earnings repatriated by owners, players, and other team and stadium personnel to their
residences; 2) the costs incurred to operate the stadium to include the
opportunity costs; and 3) business losses incurred locally as a consequence of peak usage of local resources on game day. Stated somewhat
differently, local business activity may have been crowded out.
The Pioneer Square neighborhood, to be sure, experienced significantly more economic transactions as a consequence of the Kingdome.
Assume for the moment that we think of Pioneer Square as a business
entity and that we identify the Kingdome as a part of Pioneer Square’s
stock of capital. 3 From this business, capital stock income flowed
when tickets, baseball paraphernalia, and hot dogs were sold. The economic impact, however, was not equal to gross spending changes any
more than revenues are equal to business profits. Explicit and implicit
costs arose as a consequence of conducting events at the Kingdome,
and the economic contribution that the Kingdome made to Pioneer
Square was not consonant with gross financial inflows but rather with
net financial inflows to the neighborhood. Two facts may well serve to
vitiate the economic impact the operation of the Kingdome would at
first blush appear to provide. First, the stadium may have served as little more than an economic conduit through which spending on Kingdome events passed from one set of nonresident hands to another.
Second, the level and urgency of game day activities may have well
strained local resources by crowding out local, normal business activity. If either of these effects were pronounced, the neighborhood in
which the stadium was located would have derived far less stimulation
than that suggested by the direct spending that occurred within the stadium’s walls.
The first point can be illustrated through tracing player salaries. A
stadium does not resemble the corner grocery where the owners live
above the store. Rather the stadium owners and the stadium employees, who receive most of the event revenues, are in all probability not
neighborhood residents. Thus even if fans are not residents and their
spending represents an infusion of funds, the boost provided is short
lived because the nonresident owners and players appropriate that
spending in the form of their profits and wages. Recent developments
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in professional sports as they relate to stadium construction may well
be making the transfer of funds from one group of nonresidents to
another more complete. In negotiations with their host cities, teams
have more aggressively and thoroughly exploited the advantage
imparted by an excess demand for teams. The new breed of stadiums
have evolved into small walled cities that more completely compete
with and capture the economic activity that used to spill out into the
neighborhood. This stadium/mall concept has been encouraged by the
leagues to help level the financial playing fields of league members.
Furthermore, in their anxiety to attract or retain their teams, cities have
been agreeing to more generous leases that allow teams to appropriate
virtually all of the revenues from ticket sales, concessions, the sale of
sports paraphernalia, parking, stadium advertising, and naming rights.
The quid pro quo for these “sweetheart” leases is that the team dedicate
one revenue source or another to satisfy public demands for a team
“equity” stake in the ballpark project. Teams readily agree because the
present value of increased stadium earnings exceeds by a significant
amount the present value of the dedicated revenue stream(s).
Owners have argued that stadiums are necessary to satisfy player
demands for higher salaries. Suppose for the moment that this owner
rationale is true. Today for the NBA and NFL, the two sports leagues
that first instituted salary caps, the share of league gross revenues to
which players as a group are entitled by agreement is 57.5 and 63 percent of league gross revenues, respectively. It follows, therefore, that
significantly more than half of the spending that occurs at the ballpark
finds its way into the pockets of players. If players do not live in the
community or otherwise do not spend on community goods and services, then more than one-half of the revenue that finds its way into the
stadium on game day leaks from the neighborhood. In the case of
Seattle, it is a virtual certainty that few, if any, of the Seattle Seahawks’
owners and players live in Pioneer Square. In fact, the market for players is national, many of them do not establish their primary residences
in the cities in which they play. Players invest their earnings internationally and are taxed nationally, therefore, much of what they earn
leaves not only the Pioneer Square economy but the metropolitan economy as well.
The point made through tracing player salaries applies to taxes
imposed by nonlocal government. Ignoring for the moment “home
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rule,” how much of the sales tax on sports clothing or excise taxes on
game tickets is retained by the local government? Much of it becomes
a part of general revenues for the State, County, or City government
imposing the tax, and the extent to which it is returned to the local government depends on institutional arrangement. The local governments
which provide space for the stadium need to have a hand in shaping
revenue sharing to ensure that their costs for providing stadium space
are covered. They also must understand the extent to which the stadium and team activities affect general tax revenues at higher the levels
of government from which they derive a share. Such an analysis is
hardly trivial, but it must be undertaken if the neighborhood is to make
wise decisions with regard to the use of its scarce land resource.
Opportunity and operating costs, as well as the likelihood that stadium activity will “crowd out” local economic activity, depend on the
character of the neighborhood economy. Is there a natural synergy
between the stadium and neighborhood, or will expenses mount and
displacement and inactivity occur on a scale that ensures the cost of
hosting the stadium exceeds the expected benefit? Stadiums require
large tracts of land not only for structures but also for parking if the stadium site or the institutional character of the metropolis or region
makes it accessible primarily by automobile. Stadiums are not like
shopping malls where economic activity occurs throughout the course
of a day every day. Stadiums, particularly open-air football stadiums,
spend more time waiting than working. How the community handles
the “dead time” in the stadium and its attendant areas is critical to its
ability to use the facility to its economic advantage. Did the Pioneer
Square neighborhood and the Kingdome enjoy a synergistic relationship? If not, could the lack of synergy have been anticipated by analyzing the community’s economic character? To help establish the fit
between the neighborhood and the stadium, a survey was conducted to
assess the impact of the Kingdome on local businesses. The survey is
appended to the paper, and the results of it are discussed in the next
section of the paper.
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SURVEY RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Compared with other districts in Seattle, the Pioneer Square district is more commercially diverse. Although retail businesses are most
prevalent within the Business Improvement Area (BIA) of the district,
constituting 20.3 percent of all businesses, there are significantly fewer
than in other districts such as Broadway and Roosevelt, which exhibit
retail percentages of 56 and 54 percent, respectively. Professional services, legal services, and art galleries account for 17.6, 13.1, and 9.2
percent, respectively, of all businesses within the Pioneer Square BIA
(krs services, inc. 1998). Figures 3 and 4 define the Pioneer Square
urban village footprint and the Pioneer Square BIA boundaries, respectively (krs services, inc. 1998).
In comparing the character of the businesses in Pioneer Square
with businesses in other districts in Seattle, several attributes distinguish the enterprises of Pioneer Square. The businesses in the Kingdome neighborhood tend to have had shorter histories, are more labor
intensive, exhibit a greater tendency to rent their commercial spaces,
and are smaller. To wit, 86 percent of the businesses within the BIA
gross less than $1 million per year (krs services, inc. 1998). All of this
indicates that the businesses of Pioneer Square are more fragile in general than enterprises in other districts in Seattle. Where controversial
urban projects are concerned, this is not inconsonant with national
trends. Districts that are successful in preventing the development (airports, incinerators, and stadiums) from occurring in their neighborhood
(“not in my backyard”) are generally populated by commercial interests that are big, established, wealthy, and politically connected.
Downtown stadiums are generally constructed in warehouse or old
railroad yards where land is relatively cheap and political resistance is
relatively feeble. These fringe downtown areas, however, are often in
the incipient stages of development or have clear alternative uses. The
concern of residents and local entrepreneurs in such areas is that the
stadium may channel development in directions that are not compatible
with the emerging pattern of growth. The survey results indicated that
the activities at the Kingdome frustrated rather than contributed to
many business activities in Pioneer Square. The reason cited in every

The Economics of Sports

Figure 3 Pioneer Square Urban Village Footprint Boundaries
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Figure 4 Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area Boundaries
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instance of business disruption had to do with parking and general congestion created by events at the Kingdome.
Table 1 provides the result of the survey conducted in Pioneer
Square June 26 through June 30, 1998.
Table 1 Reported Percentage Changes in Revenues for Businesses in
Pioneer Square as a Consequence of the Kingdomea (n = 35)

Business type

Increase by Increase by
Decrease by Decrease by
less than Remain less than
more than
more than
25%
constant
25%
25%
25%b

Eating and drinking
placesc

2

2

1d

Hotels, motels
Art galleries

2

2

Clothing, jewelry and
other retaile

3

1

Professional services to
include legal

1

Entertainment, discos,
tourist attractions
Total

5

6

6
1

1

1

3

8

3
2

2

7

11

SOURCE: Author’s survey.
a If the results for the Mariners and Seahawks differed, the convention used was to
report the baseball result for two reasons. First, many businesses were not open on
Sundays when the Seahawks normally play. Second, the baseball Mariners had 81
home dates compared to eight regular season games for the Mariners. There were 10
cases in which businesses were open on Sunday and reported different impacts
(degree, not direction) for the Mariners and Seahawks.
b Percentage changes are reported to insure autonomy for the businesses that participated in the survey.
c In general, the eating and drinking establishments closest to the Kingdome benefited
most from its operation. The impact, in general, diminished with each additional
block of distance.
d Hotel located outside the Pioneer Square footprint.
e Those retail outlets that reported an increase in sales were both in the business of selling sports paraphernalia.
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Several conclusions can be drawn based on the survey and interviews of businesses in the Pioneer Square BIA. First, bars that have a
sports theme and a location adjacent to the Kingdome derived substantial benefits. Sports bars/restaurants in the immediate vicinity of the
Kingdome reported as much as an 800 percent increase in revenues
from Mariners’ games on weekdays and an increase in business by
1700 percent from weekend Mariners games. Second, the increase in
the bar/restaurant business generally was inversely related to the establishment’s distance from the Kingdome. Unless the bar had a particularly compelling sports identity, three or four blocks walking distance
from the stadium was sufficient to eliminate most of the positive economic impact cited by bars a block or less away. Proximity, however,
is no guarantee of success. If the bar/restaurant was not on a pedestrian
thoroughfare, the impact was also muted. To cite an example, one bar/
restaurant a block and one-half from the stadium, but removed from
the constellation of bars frequented by fans after a game, attempted to
build a clientele with sports promotions and themes with no success.
The bar has changed hands four times in the past few years due to a
lack of business. Third, the success of the sports bar/restaurant is
highly sensitive to the success of the teams. Not only does a winning
team attract more fans to the stadium, but apparently fans supporting
mediocre or losing teams are in no mood to celebrate. Several sports
bars that gushed about the positive impact of the Mariners and Seahawks sounded a much more sober note in describing the Mariners
impact on business in 1998 and other years in which the teams did not
compete for a championship.
Other businesses did not share the enthusiasm or the success of the
sports bar entrepreneurs for the Kingdome and its teams. Ethnic restaurants, art galleries, professional services, legal services, and most
retail outlets reported a decline in business generally in the neighborhood of 25 percent or less. Some professional service establishments,
including law offices, have considered changing their location because
of the difficulties they encounter meeting clients on game days. The
culprit cited by all firms adversely affected by the Kingdome was inadequate parking.4 As noted previously, the Kingdome parking lots were
insufficient to meet the peak traffic flow during stadium events. Automobiles spilled into the neighborhood crowding out normal business
activity by using scarce parking spaces. If local spending that occurs
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in conjunction with the stadium events equaled or exceeded local
spending that would occur in the absence of the stadium events, then
on balance the local economy would gain. The means for measuring
the net spending change are inadequate, but it is clear that the stadium
activity did channel business into certain realms and away from others
and did create the need for additional parking.
The demand for parking for peak neighborhood activity connected
with stadium events creates a dilemma for the community. On one
hand, building more parking structures or surface lots minimized the
economic disruption caused by the excess demand for parking. On the
other hand, using scarce land to accommodate peak parking demand
for a few hours of approximately one hundred days would change the
character of the neighborhood. Also, providing for more parking
would likely create negative externalities and “public goods” issues
that would be esthetic as well as economic in nature. Parking lots are
strictly utilitarian. They are not attractive structures and have no particular architectural character.
A second option is to price the parking to discourage the quantity
of it demanded. One of the bitterest complaints relating to the Pioneer
Square parking problems is the increase in parking prices on game day.
Participants in the survey reported that lot parking rates double on
game or event days and that “meter maids” get more aggressive, thus
raising the implicit parking price. The parking problem could be exacerbated further because two stadiums will replace the Kingdome. No
agreement has been reached to prohibit the use of the two stadiums on
the same day. If events are held on the same day and are highly
attended, then the parking problem could escalate dramatically.
Despite what is now the north parking lot will be used for housing,
government has promised that the number of parking spaces in the Pioneer Square area will be increased through the construction of at least
one new tiered parking lot. Of course, tiered parking structures are far
more expensive than surface lots, and egress from them is slower.
The parking problem can be mitigated if the public opts for using
the area public transit. Union Station (rail) and the International District Station for the International Transit Tunnel (bus) are a few blocks
northeast of the dome. The Pioneer Square Station of the Downtown
Transit Tunnel is only a few blocks further away from the Kingdome.
Closing some streets to parking on game day and raising parking prices
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is designed, in part, to encourage transportation to the stadium using
some means other than automobiles. It should be noted that the use of
public transportation requires a significant cultural modification. It is
arguable that people in the western part of the United States are unusually partial to automobile transit and display a reluctance to use public
transportation. How much inconvenience or additional expense will be
required to motivate them to opt for alternative transportation? That
question is being debated by people not only in Seattle but throughout
the West and the entire United States. Because 50 percent of the businesses inside the BIA and 90 percent of the businesses ringing the BIA
indicated that transportation was critical to their business (krs services,
inc., 1998), the automobile transportation problem as it relates to Pioneer Square has to be resolved. Parking validation programs for residents and business customers, shuttle buses for neighborhood
employees, and park and ride (satellite parking) programs are being
seriously considered.
In summary, the results of our survey indicated that less than onethird of the businesses located in Pioneer Square reported revenue
increases attributable to the Kingdome. Aside from the parking lot
business, bars and restaurants with a sports identity benefited, as did
Pioneer Square hotels. In general, however, most businesses located in
Pioneer Square (retail, professional services, legal services, and art galleries) reported that their revenues either remained constant or suffered
as a consequence of the Kingdome. This finding echoes results
reported in the recent survey conducted by krs services, inc. On page
13 of their July 24, 1998 study, the firm reported:
It is interesting to note that lack of dependence by the
majority of Pioneer Square businesses on tourists,
spectators at sporting/Kingdome events and participants in
the First Thursday or gallery activities . . .
It is also interesting that, according to those who
participated in the survey, there appears to be as much
business reliance on customers attending First Thursday or
patronizing art galleries as there are spectators attending
sporting events or other activities at the Kingdome.
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Reportedly, the Kingdome adversely affects certain businesses in
Pioneer Square because of its peak use of key community resources,
most notably parking, during stadium events. In general, the stadium’s
overall economic impact on the neighborhood was uncertain. Therefore, with any new urban stadium, overall economic activity could
increase, remain constant, or decrease. What is clear is that city governments cannot assume that the influx of spectators into a neighborhood for a stadium event will translate into increased economic activity
to a degree commensurate with the number of visitors. Indeed, in identifying the reasons why a stadium may not induce an expansion of the
metropolitan economy, one may not have to look any further than the
neighborhood in which the stadium is located. In the neighborhood,
the substitution effects, which negate the impact of fan spending in
conjunction with the sporting events, are most apparent.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There appears to be growing agreement that professional sports
teams and stadiums have little if any economic impact on their host cities. The lack of economic impact is explained by simple budgetary
realities. If the fans attending the sporting events are indigenous to the
city hosting the event, then the time and money they spend spectating
at sporting events is vitiated by reduced spending elsewhere within the
metropolitan area. The impact on the local or neighborhood economy
in which the stadium is located is less clear. The influx of nonresidents
on game or event day suggests substantial economic impact. Does
more careful empirical analysis confirm casual observation? Does the
downtown benefit from the construction of a sports stadium?
The evidence from Seattle is decidedly mixed. Clearly the stadium
channels economic activity in the direction of businesses that have a
connection to sports. Stadium bars and restaurants and retail outlets
selling sports paraphernalia benefit. Many other businesses, particularly those that do not appeal to sports fans, lose business. This occurs
as a consequence of peak use of shared community resources on event
day; parking and sidewalk space are the most obvious examples. Customers that ordinarily would patronize local businesses do not on event
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day because the cost and inconvenience of doing so increases. Routine
or normal business, therefore, is crowded out on a scale that may well
offset any neighborhood gains. Unless the excess demand for key local
resources is somehow mitigated, many other commercial activities in
the neighborhood are destined to decline.
The policy implications are clear. Whether the stadium contributes
meaningfully to the local economy depends on the nature of that economy and its ability to minimize the disruption caused by peak stadium
traffic. This requires careful planning and a willingness on the part of
professional sports teams to be good citizens. The political power that
professional sports teams currently wield forces neighborhood businesses and residents to shoulder a disproportionate share of the risks
and inconvenience associated with the influx of fans on game days.
Local residents, business employees, and other business patrons have
to be given parking priorities. Remote parking and an emphasis on
public transportation are essential to maintaining neighborhood economic vitality.
In addition to parking concessions, owners of professional sports
teams need to share the commerce associated with sports spectating.
The modern stadium doubles as a shopping mall complete with food
courts whose operation serves to minimize the neighborhood economic
impact. The fact that souvenir venders are prohibited from operating
too close to some new stadiums in the U.S. is one overt manifestation
of excessive team influence and a lack of citizenship.
Legislators have been sensitive to the demise of urban America for
a variety of reasons, and, as a consequence, initiatives designed to rejuvenate downtowns have enjoyed some support at the state and federal
levels. There are what economists would identify as externality issues
associated with urban blight, and it could be argued that revitalizing
downtowns generates benefits that spill beyond the urban core. If this
is so, nonlocal public subsidies for downtown redevelopment may have
merit. Before stadiums can be used to rejuvenate the downtown, it
must be determined that they represent the best use of that land. Parking and the nature of economic development that sports fosters are factors that have to be weighed in those land-use decisions. Professional
sports leagues operate as unregulated monopolies, and until that issue
is addressed, poor decisions with regard to the location and operation
of stadiums will continue to occur. The most important policy implica-
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tion is to revamp the structure of professional sports leagues to ensure
that the greatest good for the greatest number is ensured.

Notes
1. Direct expenditures are “multiplied” by a number that represents the respending
of dollars spent as a consequence of the sports event. For example, the waiters at
a restaurant that attracts fans after the game receives tips that are in turn spent by
the waiter on goods and services provided by the local economy. For an example
of an analysis that uses gross expenditures see Shils (1989).
2. With the construction of the baseball stadium, approximately 1,200 of those parking spots have been eliminated in the south parking lot. For an event that attracts
a capacity crowd, the 2,400 available stadium parking spaces implies there are 27
fans for each parking space. Given the use of automobiles by fans, the industry
standard has been three or four fans for each parking space.
3. Representing the neighborhood as a business admittedly captures only a portion
of a community’s character and quality of life, but such a representation provides
some useful insights.
4. In the July 24, 1998 survey conducted by krs services, inc., businesses gave parking the highest priority in improving Pioneer Square. Parking, however, is not a
problem unique to Pioneer Square. In six other recently surveyed Seattle business
districts, parking was listed as the first or second highest priority in four of the six
districts.
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APPENDIX
Survey of the Effects the Kingdome
on Commercial Activity in Seattle
Note to the participant: Your responses to this survey will be kept strictly
confidential. Individual responses will not be reported separately. The data a
business provides will be reported only as part of an overall result in which
variables such as the change in revenues will be represented as percent changes.
1. Business or firm name _________________________________________
2. Location of business __________________________________________
3. Proximity to Kingdome__________walking minutes____________miles
4. Type of business ____________________________________________
(Office use only: SIC code =
).
5. Business structure: ___ Corporate ___Franchise ___ Sole proprietorship
___ Locally owned ___ Nationally owned
6. On-street parking ___Yes ___No
Parking on street is metered ___Yes ___No
___ Distance to nearest parking garage/lot
___ Proximity to public transportation.
7. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Mariners
___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%
___ stays the same
8. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Seahawks
___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%
___ stays the same
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9. If revenue decreases on game day it is because of (rank on a scale of 0–5,
where 0 represents no effect and 5 represents a significant effect):
___ inadequate parking ___ competition from stadium amenities
___ general stadium congestion ___ behavior of those who attend games.
10. Revenue Data:
Typical revenue from the business: ___ Weekday ___Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Mariners’ game:
___ Weekday ___ Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Seahawks’ game:
___ Weekday ___ Weekend
11. Other comments:
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Who is Sitting in the Stands?
The Income Levels of Sports Fans
John J. Siegfried and Timothy Peterson
Vanderbilt University

About a decade ago, an unprecedented professional sports stadium
and arena construction boom emerged in the United States as professional sports team owners began to recognize their ability to play
image-conscious metropolitan areas off against each other. New stadiums and arenas were attractive to these team owners not because their
games could not be played in existing facilities—most of the existing
stadiums and arenas were less than thirty years old and many were far
from sold out—but rather because revenue prospects began to depend
on new stadium configurations. Architects of the 1960s and 1970s who
built the old-style arenas and stadiums did not anticipate how many
wealthy individuals and corporations would be willing to pay for the
status, exclusivity, and amenities of club seats and luxury boxes. However, rapid economic growth, rising income inequality, and the increasing popularity of relative status have combined to create an enormous
demand for high-end sports services in the 1990s. When team owners
report that their stadium is “inadequate,” they mean that it is inadequate to produce the revenues that the team owner would prefer to collect.
Revenue enhancement alone, however, is not necessarily worthwhile to team owners. Prospective incremental revenues must be
weighed against the additional costs required to attract them. That is
where a taxpayer-financed stadium fits into a team’s income statement.
Stadiums that provide exclusive seating in luxury boxes and club seats
are expensive to build. Costs are always lower, of course, if the owner
can get someone else to foot the construction bill and then pay them a
trivial rental rate for use of the facility, as characterizes many recently
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constructed sports stadiums and arenas. 1 Furthermore, without the
sunk costs of stadium ownership to tie him down, the owner increases
his ability to extract further concessions from the local population by
periodically threatening to move the team. If the team receives revenues from nonsports uses of the facility throughout the year, a contract
provision that is fashionable in modern stadium and arena leases, the
owners’ revenues can be expanded further.
The vast majority of premier league professional sports stadiums
constructed in the 1990s have been financed partly by taxpayers,
including federal, state, and local (Noll and Zimbalist 1998, appendix
to chapter 1). About 25 state and local governments have provided at
least $100 million each in subsidies to professional sports teams
(Rosentraub 1997, pp. 16). Even the few new stadiums that have been
privately financed usually have benefited from a substantial public
underwriting for access roads and utilities infrastructure.
Federal taxpayers contribute to these stadiums and arenas primarily by means of the federal government forgoing tax revenue on interest paid to holders of tax exempt municipal bonds used to finance
construction (Zimmerman 1998). These forgone tax revenues must
either be made up elsewhere or public services reduced accordingly.
State and local tax support is more direct, often involving direct outlays
of property tax receipts, or the earmarking of either sales tax revenues
collected on tickets to the events held in the facility or revenues from a
lottery. Unless all of the facility’s patrons are from outside the local
area, at least some, and usually a large proportion of these earmarked
tax revenues would have been collected by the state or local tax authority anyway as local consumers purchased other taxable items as part of
their established expenditure pattern.
In spite of the often emotional public debate about the equity consequences of public policy, the controversy surrounding stadiums and
arenas has focused largely on local economic development prospects
and opportunities to enhance a metropolitan area’s public image.
Unfortunately, the debates usually center on the financing of stadiums
and arenas rather than on net economic effects. Financial transfers are
treated as costs to those who provide the financing and benefits to those
who receive it regardless of the expansion or contraction of real economic activity. The focus on financial implications of public subsidies
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for sports facilities leaves both the efficiency and equity consequences
of such policies largely unexamined.

EVALUATING PUBLIC PROJECTS
In the 1960s economists adopted a taxonomy for evaluating public
projects. This taxonomy involved two parts: efficiency and equity
effects (Okun 1975). A literature developed to assist in measuring economic benefits and costs and especially in identifying easy to overlook
opportunity costs. Methodological contributions focused on properly
weighing benefits against costs.
In recent years economists have begun to apply this taxonomy to
the public provision of sports facilities. Robert Baade (1987, 1994,
1996) stimulated more careful analysis of the claims of stadium proponents through a series of studies assessing the economic impact of new
teams and/or facilities on local economies. Roger Noll and Andrew
Zimbalist’s (1997) recently published Sports, Jobs, and Taxes organizes much of what is now known about the efficiency consequences of
publicly provided stadiums and arenas and helps to distinguish real
economic effects of such facilities from the financial transfers surrounding them.

EQUITY ISSUES
To date, however, there seems to have been little interest in the
equity consequences of public policy relating to sports facilities. Some
groups that oppose political referendums on public subsidies for sports
stadiums or arenas assert that the poor are buying playgrounds for the
rich, but there is little objective evidence available about the income
redistribution consequences that arise when communities allocate public funds for the construction of sports facilities for privately owned
professional sports teams.2
The distributional consequences of public projects are complicated
because many direct burdens and benefits are passed along to taxpayers
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or beneficiaries who do not attract attention. The extent to which benefits and/or costs are passed along depends on the magnitude of various
elasticities of supply and demand that are extremely difficult to evaluate. For example, a common method of financing new venues is to earmark either sales taxes collected on tickets sold to events in the facility,
on restaurants, on rental cars, or on hotel and motel use. Even if one
assumes that none of these taxes would have been collected by the taxing authority were those who buy tickets to have purchased alternative
items, the ultimate incidence of such ad valorem sales or hotel taxes
depends on the elasticities of supply and demand. As thousands of
introductory economics students show on problem sets and exams each
year, if demand is inelastic and supply is elastic, the consumers bear
relatively more of the burden. On the other hand, if demand is elastic,
and supply is inelastic, the suppliers bear most of the burden. The
challenge, of course, is measuring the relevant elasticities.

WHO PAYS THE SUBSIDY?
A careful accounting of the distributional effects of publicly subsidized stadium or arena projects requires an assessment of the sources
of revenue as well as the beneficiaries of the services provided and the
recipients of the revenues. Identifying who pays for stadium subsidies
is complicated because there are usually multiple revenue sources, and
the ultimate incidence of different taxes varies. Local taxes are raised
primarily via levies on retail sales, property, and hotel and motel use.
Because the marginal propensity to consume is less than one, general
sales taxes are usually considered regressive, especially if the tax base
includes food and clothing. Property taxes, at least in intermediate
ranges, are thought by some economists (Pechman 1985) to be proportional; at the higher ranges they may be progressive (O’Sullivan 1996).
The incidence of hotel and motel taxes is difficult to assess because
such taxes are paid primarily by myriad businesses that, in competitive
markets, would pass them along to their customers. Incidence would
ultimately depend on the affluence of those customers. In an analysis
that tried to trace such specific taxes through the economy to the indi-
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viduals who ultimately pay them, Siegfried, McElroy, and Sweeney
(1982) found hotel and motel taxes to be progressive.
State revenues to subsidize sports facilities are raised primarily from
general sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, lotteries, or a
“sin tax” on alcohol. Both federal, and state or local personal income
taxes are modestly progressive (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 227). The
incidence of corporate income taxes is complex and remains controversial. Lotteries are regressive, although they may be less objectionable
because they are a “voluntary tax” (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 223).
Siegfried and colleagues found taxes on alcohol to be mildly progressive; Clotfelter and Cook (p. 227) report evidence that taxes on alcohol
are regressive.
Finally, the federal government’s revenue sources are so diverse
that it would be virtually impossible to predict which taxes would be
higher because of federal subsidies to sports facilities. Because federally tax exempt municipal bonds are attractive only to those lenders in
relatively high marginal income tax brackets, however, we can be sure
that some of the benefits accrue to relatively high income individuals.
The costs are borne either by those who would have benefited from the
alternative public projects that would have been funded in the absence
of the tax break for municipal bonds used to finance sports facilities or
by those who pay the marginal taxes.

WHO BENEFITS DIRECTLY FROM THE SUBSIDY?
The incidence of taxation is a subject for another day, however.
Here we want to learn about the income characteristics of the beneficiaries of publicly provided sports facilities. This is but a simple first
step toward assessing the distributional impact of public subsidies for
professional sports facilities. To address this question, it is useful first
to categorize the primary beneficiaries of subsidies for new sports stadiums or arenas.
The most obvious beneficiaries are claimants on team revenues.
New sports stadiums are desired by teams because they enhance team
revenues through opportunities to lease luxury boxes, sell club seating
tickets at premium prices, increase concession revenues, and expand
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advertising revenues, e.g., signs in the stadium and/or stadium “naming
rights.” To the extent that new playing facilities increase the demand
for tickets, owners of teams in other league cities benefit too through
revenue sharing in Major League Baseball (MLB) and in the National
Football League (NFL). Net revenues also climb as a team’s facility
costs disappear. Players and team owners carve up most of professional sports teams’ revenues. Both groups are comprised of very high
income individuals. There is little doubt that to the extent that public
subsidies of sports stadiums and arenas allow teams to increase net revenues by expanding revenue opportunities and reducing team costs, the
lion’s share of those revenues go to individuals in the top one-tenth of
one percent of the national income distribution.
Of the 115 major league men’s professional sports teams operating
in 1998, the controlling interest in at least 28 was owned by an individual on the 1998 Forbes magazine list of the wealthiest 400 Americans
(Gorham, Kafka, and Neelakantan 1998). If the 50 wealthiest family
groups and minority interests in sports teams are added to the number
of teams owned by “top 400” wealthiest individuals, the count swells
to 38.3 Public subsidies to stadiums or arenas constitute a subsidy program for some of the wealthiest people in the country, each of whom
has net assets exceeding half a billion dollars.
Players are not nearly as wealthy as owners. The average income
of players in the National Basketball Association (NBA), National
Hockey League (NHL), NFL, and MLB in 1998 was $2.6, $1.2, $0.8,
and $1.3 million, respectively; minimum salaries in the leagues were
$242,000, $125,000, $158,000, and $170,000, respectively. While not
in the stratosphere of the average team owner’s wealth, even those premier league professional athletes earning the “minimum wage” earn
numerous standard deviations of income more than typical Americans.
Those athletes who are paid the average for their league earn more in a
single year than an average American might expect to earn in a lifetime.
Team owners and players receive most of a team’s incremental revenues because they own the ultimate scarce resources. Team owners
possess the scarce rights to participate in the premier league in their
sport. They limit entry into the league to preserve this scarcity value.
Absent scarcity of franchises, there would be little reason for anyone to
pay much of anything in excess of the market value of future player
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contracts (the relatively small extent to which the value of the players’
services exceeds their contractual salaries) and equipment for an existing franchise when they could simply secure a new one. Since expansion franchises have no player contracts or equipment, they would be
free. The actual price of franchises reflects monopoly power and little
else. Owners clearly have title to a scarce resource—access to the premier league championship.
Players also possess monopoly rights, since they (and especially
“star” players) own the scarce resources necessary to produce professional sporting events. Fans would not be willing to pay to see Tim
Peterson and John Siegfried replace Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen
on the NBA champion Chicago Bulls. In fact, fans would not be willing to pay as much to see top NBA “lottery” draft picks replace Jordan
and Pippen. Star players control a differentiated product for which
there are often no good substitutes in the eyes of the fans—their athletic talent and personalities. Under such circumstances economic theory predicts that at least some portion of net revenues made available
by a public subsidy that expands gross revenues and reduces facility
costs will be transferred to players.4 These net revenues are virtually
all economic rent.
In addition to the revenues divided between players and owners,
there may be direct benefits that accrue to consumers. Only in that rare
case when a consumer is completely indifferent to the choice between
purchasing a good or service or not is no consumer’s surplus created.
In recent years, sports teams have successfully designed price discrimination schemes to extract some of this consumer’s surplus. However,
because few people agonize over the decisions either to buy a ticket or
to watch a game on television, there is no question that some surplus
remains for almost every purchaser of tickets or viewer of games on
television.
The direct demand for professional sporting events is manifested
primarily through the demand for tickets to live professional sporting
events and the demand for viewing games on television. Although
there is no way to determine the magnitude of consumer surplus
enjoyed by those who buy tickets or view games on television, we can
be sure that most of the fans receive some consumer surplus. It is of
more than passing interest to identify these individuals because they
are the local consumers who will enjoy increased utility from a subsidy
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to a stadium or arena that either prevents a team from moving elsewhere or lures a team into the area.5 Because there is little question
that the owners and players are relatively affluent, the only prospective
direct beneficiaries of public sports facility subsidies who are not
wealthy are the fans.

INDIRECT BENEFITS
The objective of this essay is to identify the income distribution
position of the direct consumers of sports. In addition to direct private
benefits manifested in consumer’s surplus, some indirect “public consumption” benefit is likely to be provided by sports stadiums or arenas.
Such external benefits may arise from increased self-esteem enjoyed
by residents who believe that they are better off living in a “big league
city,” or who at least believe that their lives are enhanced if others view
their community as a “major league place” (Rosentraub 1997, pp. 25–
26). The fact that virtually all well- conducted studies of the economic
development effects of professional sports teams and/or new stadiums
or arenas find no impact whatsoever (an exception being a recent study
by Coats and Humphreys [1999], who found a negative effect) does not
undermine the possibility of external benefits, although it casts doubt
on their magnitude. Trickle-down economic impacts are not the only
source of external benefits. So long as the local residents believe that
they are better off with an enhanced public image and we respect consumer sovereignty, then they benefit from the team, stadium, or arena
whether the basis for their belief is valid or not.
External benefits can also arise from the personal consumption of
following a team’s fortunes, discussing the team’s success around the
water cooler, or as a rallying point that brings a community together.
Of course external costs may also arise from depression caused by a
team that chronically loses, increased traffic congestion on game days,
domestic conflict generated by the home team’s game being televised
during Thanksgiving dinner, or time diverted from work effort as
employees congregate around the water cooler more frequently than
their supervisor would like.
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It is difficult to determine how such external benefits might be distributed across individuals at different points along the income distribution. Before we even worry about their distribution, however, we need
to document the existence and magnitude of external benefits. While
doing so, we should also catalog any external costs associated with the
presence of a professional sports team. Zimmerman (1998, p. 122) suggests that these benefits might be valued equally by all individuals or
that fans (particularly those fans who purchase tickets to games) are
likely to value them more than others. If such external benefits are distributed in proportion to fan purchases of tickets, then our efforts to
understand the income position of those who purchase tickets and view
games on television will simultaneously reveal the distribution of the
external benefits. On the other hand, the distribution of these external
benefits may differ from the distribution of benefits that accrue to buyers of tickets and viewers of televised game broadcasts.

WHO BUYS THE TICKETS TO SPORTING EVENTS?
The individuals who purchase tickets for professional sporting
events are the people who enjoy the consumers’ surplus from the direct
consumption of sporting event services. Thus, it is of interest to learn
precisely who are the people who enjoy benefits in excess of the price
they pay for tickets to the games. It is these people who secure direct
benefits from the presence of a professional sporting team and/or stadium or arena. To the extent that a publicly subsidized stadium or
arena attracts a team to a community or prevents an incumbent franchise from moving elsewhere, it is those who buy tickets to the games
or who receive more enjoyment from watching games on television
that involve their hometown team rather than teams from other cities
who are direct beneficiaries of the public subsidy.
Our argument that fans benefit from a publicly subsidized stadium
is not a claim that ticket prices are lower because of the public subsidy.
Indeed, as a reduction in fixed costs, a rent subsidy imbedded in a 25or 30-year lease is unlikely to affect ticket prices at all. Rather it is a
balancing of marginal costs against marginal revenues that identifies
the profit maximizing ticket price level. Our interest in the affluence of
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sports ticket purchasers instead hinges on the belief that the very existence of the opportunity to purchase tickets and attend games in one’s
hometown depends on the public subsidy because of the artificial scarcity of premier league teams created by the monopoly leagues. The
public subsidy creates some amount of consumer surplus for the fans
who purchase tickets by means of its responsibility for the team’s presence. Each fan who purchases tickets must be better off than he or she
would have been in the absence of the team, otherwise they would simply continue their previous consumption pattern and decline to purchase tickets.

THE DATA
As part of its Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), the Bureau of
Labor Statistics interviews a continuous rotating panel of households
in the U.S. to collect data for calculating the Consumer Price Index.
This nationally representative recall survey provides information on
expenditure patterns and income levels of slightly more than 5,000
households each quarter.6 It is constructed so that each quarter can be
treated as an independent sample; thus four quarters of data furnishes a
sample of about 20,000 U.S. households.
We use two types of information from the 1994 CES samples: pretax family income and itemized expenditures for: “admission fees to
sporting events,” and “admission fees to sporting events on out-of-town
trips.” Admission fees include both single-game and season tickets.
All of the sporting event tickets documented in the CES were purchased by individuals; we have no information on tickets purchased by
businesses or who enjoys the use of those tickets. It is likely that this
omission biases downward the reported income levels of those who
attend sporting events.
Sporting events are all inclusive. They range from auto and horse
racing to professional golf and tennis, or whatever survey respondents
consider “sporting events.” Minor league baseball as well as college
sporting events are included. A large fraction of the money spent on
tickets, however, is accounted for by the four major men’s professional
team sports—baseball, basketball, football, and ice hockey, each of
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which is well practiced in the art of negotiating subsidized facilities for
their team’s games.7
Data from the 1972–1973 CES, revealed that the typical purchasers of season tickets to sporting events had median incomes 58 percent
above the average (McElroy, Siegfried, and Sweeney 1982). Those
purchasers of single-game tickets had median incomes about 10 percent above the overall average. In the early 1970s, sports teams had
not yet discovered the lucrative personal seat license (PSL) system of
extracting payments in excess of the face value of tickets from morerabid fans. The price of PSLs makes it unlikely that a stadium crowd in
2000 consists of many people holding minimum wage jobs, aside from
the ushers and concession workers serving those in the club seats and
luxury boxes. If anything, the disparity between the income level of
those attending professional sporting events and the average “Joe Sixpack” has widened over time.
By 1994 the CES no longer separated season tickets from singlegame tickets. It did, however, distinguish tickets purchased while at
home from those purchased while traveling out-of-town. We combine
these two categories of sporting event tickets into a single “sporting
event tickets” category.8
Our analysis is based on four quarters of data from 1994. Tickets
to sporting events were purchased by an average of 5.6 percent of the
consumer units each quarter (totaling 1,147 consumer units for the
year). Thus, up to (but more likely a lot less than) 22 percent of consumer units might purchase tickets during a full year.

INCOME LEVELS OF SPORTS TICKET PURCHASERS
Table 1 reports measures of central tendency for income levels of
consumers who do and do not purchase sporting event tickets. The
unweighted mean personal income level of consumers who bought
sporting event tickets shows that they enjoy average incomes 59 percent above those who do not purchase sporting event tickets. 9 The
weighted mean weights the income levels of households that bought
tickets by their expenditures on tickets and is a more accurate reflection
of the personal income levels of those who typically use the tickets.
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Table 1 Income Levels of Consumers by Attendance at Sporting Events,
1994a
Simple
mean

Weighted
mean

Median

A. Consumers who purchase tickets to
sporting events

$48,288

$56,124

$42,663

B. Consumers who do not purchase
tickets to sporting events

$30,350

$30,350

$22,258

1.59

1.85

1.92

Income of

C. Ratio of A:B

SOURCE: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1994 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
a Incomes are in nominal 1994 dollars.

Not surprisingly, the weighted mean shows a larger income gap (85
percent) between consumers who do and do not purchase tickets to
sporting events. We also report median income levels because mean
income levels can be affected by extremely high incomes of a few consumers and by the 1994 CES practice of “topcoding” all incomes
exceeding $300,000 at $300,000. 10 Using medians, the difference
between the two groups is 92 percent.
Depending on the measure of central tendency, sporting event consumers have incomes from 59 to 92 percent above the levels of consumers who do not buy sporting event tickets. When consumers who
buy sporting event tickets are mixed with those who do not, the 1994
median income level is $23,194. Thus, the median income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets is 84 percent above the overall
median income level. This number is in contrast to the 58 percent differential for season tickets and 10 percent differential for single-game
tickets in 1972–1973. Because only a small fraction of the consumer
units purchase tickets, the reported averages for those who buy no tickets at all are always close to the overall U.S. average income.
In computing weighted means, those consumers purchasing a disproportionate share of tickets to sporting events have a greater effect on
the average income level. The small sample size of 1,147 consumer
units that purchased sporting event tickets risks placing undue reliance
on the consumption patterns of relatively few consumers. To assess the
sensitivity of our results to this possibility, we eliminate households
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that individually account for over 5 percent of the total expenditures
for sporting event tickets in a quarter. This criterion eliminates seven
households (two low-income and five high-income), after which the
weighted-mean income of consumers of sporting event tickets drops
from $56,124 to $55,883. This still exceeds the mean income of consumers who did not purchase any sporting event tickets by 84 percent.
To maintain individual respondent confidentiality, the CES topcoded income at $300,000 in 1994. Four percent of households that
purchased sporting event tickets were topcoded in contrast to 1.6 percent of households that did not purchase sporting event tickets. Topcoding causes a greater downward bias in the income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets than in the income levels of consumers who do not buy sporting event tickets. It thus causes our calculations to understate the differences in income levels between sports
consumers and others. Topcoding also reveals that sporting event tickets are more than twice as likely to be purchased by consumers with
income exceeding $300,000 as are other goods and services.
The conclusion is clear. Incomes of consumers who purchase
sporting event tickets are significantly greater than incomes of consumers who do not buy tickets to sporting events. If we were able to
include in the analysis individuals who enjoy access to tickets purchased by small businesses and corporations and those who have
leased luxury boxes, the difference surely would be even greater.
Ticket prices to minor league contests and college games are substantially lower than ticket prices to premier league professional games.
Because our analysis combines all of these types of events, it undoubtedly understates the income gap between those who attend major
league professional sporting events and the general public. As more
new stadiums with relatively more luxury boxes and club seats are
completed, the gap will continue to grow.

INDIRECT EVIDENCE FROM TARGETED ADVERTISING
Consumer Expenditure Survey data do not identify the particular
sports events for which tickets are purchased. To explore differences in
income levels among the fans of different sports and to assess the rea-
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sonableness of our CES-based estimates, we collected information
about advertising in event programs, in stadiums and arenas, and on
televised broadcasts of games. Advertising in event programs is
directed at individuals who attend the events. Advertising on televised
broadcasts is directed at people who watch the games on television.
Advertising in the facility is directed at both groups, as those who
attend the games see signage in the stadium or arena, and those who
watch on television may see the signage too.
Advertising in event programs thus provides information that
should match the information we collected from the CES. Our analysis of income levels of consumers based on advertising assumes that
advertisers direct their messages at people who are most likely to purchase their products. We expect to find that the products purchased frequently by sports fans who buy tickets are advertised in event
programs. Products that are likely to be purchased by sports fans who
view games on television are likely to be advertised during television
commercials. By looking at the income levels of the consumers of
these products, we can infer the income levels of those who attend
games and those who view them on television.11
To assess the income levels of the consumers of the various goods
and services targeted by each advertising type, we first classify the specific product advertised and then identify the median income of all
consumers of that product from the CES. If an advertiser sells products in various CES categories, we assign the advertisement to all of
those categories and average the median incomes of consumers of
products in the various categories to create a representative income
level for the target audience of the advertisement. We aggregate the
income levels across the various products advertised via a particular
medium (e.g., event program or signage or television) for each of the
four professional team sports by calculating the median of the median
incomes of consumers of the various advertised products. The procedure is illustrated in Table 2, which reports the advertisers in a randomly selected Baltimore Orioles baseball game program and the
respective median income levels of the consumers of the products sold
by the advertisers.
Our research assignment consisted of reviewing many spectator
programs, advertisements on stadium walls and scoreboards, and viewing over 30 televised games. The latter was accomplished by videotap-
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Table 2 Baltimore Orioles Program Advertisements with
Corresponding Median Income Level of Consumers
of the Products or Services Advertised

Products or services advertised

Median income levels of consumers of
product or service based on CES
($)

Bacardi rum

23,480

Rums of Puerto Rico

23,480

Beck’s beer

23,480

Gordon’s vodka

23,480

Super Pretzel

25,000

Lemon Chill

25,000

Esskay hot-dogs

25,000

Old El Paso (food)

25,000

Sprint (telephone service)

25.781

Coca-Cola

27,979

Milk

27,979

Powerade (sports drink)

27,979

Deer Park (bottled water)

27,979

Rawlings Sporting Goods

28,110

Energizer batteries

29,820

Value City Furniture

31,213

Bravo Card (ATM card)

31,425

Matrix (hair care)

33,801

State Farm Insurance

34,000

NationsBank

34,125

First Union Bank

34,125

First National Bank

34,125

J.C. Penney (department store)

37,000

Montgomery Ward (department store)

37,000

St. Agnes Healthcare

37,850

Sheraton Inner Harbor Hotel

37,895

Motorola (electronics)

41,091

Adventure World (amusement park)

41,161
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Table 2 (continued)

Products or services advertised

Median income levels of consumers of
product or service based on CES
($)

Sharp computers/electronics

41,610

Starter sportswear

41,610

Diamond sportswear

41,610

Southwest Airlines

42,000

MasterCard

44,813

Saturn

48,704

Trane air conditioning

49,313

Office Depot

50,175

Tuxedo House (tuxedo rental)

52,215

Cellular One

67,018

Median of the median incomes of
consumers of products advertised

37,063

ing the games and reviewing the tapes. 12 The peculiar twist to our
research is that we fast-forwarded through the games and watched the
advertisements at normal speed!
There are some inherent weaknesses in this approach. First, products often are differentiated to appeal to people of different means. The
CES does not distinguish product categories in terms of the income of
the target audiences, however. There is no separation of “restaurants
for high-income people” from “restaurants for low-income people.”
Premium brands of imported beer are lumped in with local generic
beers. Because we group together differentiated products targeted at
low- and high-income consumers, our advertising-based method of
estimating consumer income levels should reveal less divergence
between the income levels of sports consumers and the income levels of
nonsports consumers than actually exists.
A second problem is securing sufficient data. In several cases, our
sample sizes are sufficiently small that the evidence is anecdotal rather
than systematic. We are missing signage information for basketball and
television broadcasting information for football. We report medians to

Event programs
Sport
Baseball
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Table 3 Consumer Income Levels by Sports Advertising Targetsa
Facility signs

Television advertising

Income ($)

N

Ratiob

31,898

10

1.43

33,391

9

1.50

36,277

20

1.63

n/a

n/a

40,711

8

1.83

n/a

n/a

n/a

37,065

4

1.66

Income ($)

N

Ratiob

Income ($)

N

Ratiob

Basketball

39,075

2

1.76

n/ac

Football

38,189

6

1.72

29,682

3

1.33

Ice hockey

40,255

2

1.81

37,642

6

1.69

Mean of medians across
all sports

37,326

33,572

38,016

Median income of
households that do not
purchase tickets to
sporting events

22,258

22,258

22,258

SOURCE: Authors’ survey and Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1994 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
a Incomes are in nominal 1994 dollars.
b Ratio is the ratio of the respective income levels to the income levels of consumer units that do not purchase tickets to sporting events.
c n/a indicates that no data were collected.
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avoid distortions caused by topcoding incomes. Although the advertisements were run in 1997, the median income levels we assign to the
products are from the 1994 CES. Thus the income data are in 1994
nominal dollars. All of the estimates based on the targets of advertising
are reported in Table 3.

EVENT PROGRAMS
We assembled randomly selected game programs from 10 major
league baseball teams, seven professional football teams, two professional basketball franchises, and two professional ice hockey teams.
The median of the median income levels of consumers of the various
products advertised in baseball programs ranged from $27,980 at Philadelphia Phillies games to $38,500 for those of the Chicago White Sox
games. The mean over 10 sampled baseball teams was $31,898.
The corresponding median income level targeted for fans of the
seven football teams ranged from $35,000 for Seattle Seahawks fans to
$40,225 for those of the Chicago Bears. In basketball, the Indiana Pacers had a targeted median income level of $37,895; the Minnesota Timberwolves, $40,255. Both ice hockey teams in the sample (the Detroit
Red Wings and the Tampa Bay Lightning) had identical median
incomes of consumers of products advertised in their program of
$40,255.
The ratio of the estimated income levels of consumers of products
advertised in game programs to the income levels of consumers who
do not purchase tickets to sporting events (from the CES) is also
reported in Table 3. It ranges from 1.43 for baseball to 1.81 for ice
hockey. The ratios for basketball, football, and ice hockey, ranging
from 1.72 to 1.81, are relatively close to the comparable ratio of 1.92
based on the CES data on sports event ticket purchases. This is especially so in light of our expectation that the advertising-based estimates
would understate the gap in income levels between sports ticket purchasers and others.13 The ratio for baseball is noticeably lower than for
the other three sports. Perhaps this is because the lowest-priced tickets
for baseball games are substantially below the lowest-priced tickets for
the other three sports thereby attracting a different clientele to games.
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STADIUM OR ARENA SIGNS
Stadium signs are directed both at people who attend the live
events and at the television audience. A similar procedure was used to
compute median incomes for the targeted consumers of stadium or
arena advertisements for each team in our sample. These incomes
were then averaged over the teams and are reported in Table 3.
The median income of the consumers targeted by signage ranges
from $28,010 at Los Angeles Dodgers games to $38,500 at Florida
Marlins games. For the eight baseball teams common to the sample,
the simple correlation between the estimated income levels of advertising targets of event programs and those using stadium signage is +0.36.
The medians for the three football teams range from $26,808 for the
Buffalo Bills to $34,126 for the Oakland Raiders; and for the six ice
hockey teams from $35,000 for the Detroit Red Wings to $39,000 for
the Colorado Avalanche.
In contrast to event programs, which are targeted only at people
who attend games, football stadium and ice hockey arena signs appear
to target lower-income consumers who may be viewing televised
broadcasts. The income levels of those targeted for baseball signage,
however, do not differ much from those targeted by baseball event program advertising. This inconsistency may reflect the inaccessibility of
football and ice hockey event tickets to lower income consumers who,
therefore, substitute television viewing for live attendance. However,
the income levels of fans who attend baseball games and those who
watch them on television diverge less, perhaps because baseball consumers generally have access to lower-priced bleacher seats.

TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS
Because television commercials are directed at those who are not
attending the events in person, we might expect to observe a continuation of the income-level trends that became apparent as we moved
from event programs to facility signage. To assess these income levels,
we recorded all of the advertisements on 32 nationally broadcast
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games. The sample includes 20 baseball games, eight basketball
games, and four ice hockey games. Because the teams varied and the
games were broadcast nationally, we do not distinguish income levels
by teams.
Only ice hockey advertising follows the expected trend of targeting
lower-income fans for products advertised on televised games than for
products advertised in event programs, and then only modestly so. 14
We find little difference between the median income of the consumers
targeted in televised basketball advertising and that of consumers targeted in basketball game programs. In baseball, the median income of
targeted consumers of products touted on televised broadcasts actually
exceeds the median income of consumers targeted in game programs.
If anything is to be learned from the differences, it is that fans of football and ice hockey are split by income level, with the more affluent
viewing games in person. For baseball, the opposite appears to be true;
and for basketball, there is no discernible difference in income levels of
fans sitting in the arena and those sitting on the couch watching television. The median income level of consumer units targeted on all sports
television broadcasts is similar, ranging from 63 percent to 83 percent
above the income levels of consumers who do not purchase tickets to
sporting events. Thus it appears that television viewers of sporting
events have incomes modestly below those fans who attend the games
but are still relatively affluent.
Patterns of household access to televised sporting events undoubtedly contribute to the affluence level of television viewers. The percentage of individuals who watch some television does not vary much
by household income level (ranging from 91 percent for households
with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 92 percent for households with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000 to 89 percent
for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996). However, the percentage of individuals who view cable television does vary
substantially by household income level, from 42 percent for households with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 58 percent for
households with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000, to 74
percent for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996
(Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996, p. 561). A considerable
proportion of televised sporting events is distributed exclusively on
cable television, including, but not limited to, ESPN and ESPN2.
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CONCLUSION
Consumers of sporting event tickets enjoy incomes substantially
above the average. Although consumers who watch games on television appear to have lower incomes, they too are affluent in comparison
with the nation’s overall average income.
A careful documentation of the redistributional effects of public
subsidies for sports facilities requires an accounting of the distribution
of the subsidies to the teams (which are generally divided between
players and owners, almost all individuals in both groups being very
affluent), an assessment of the incidence of indirect benefits such as
community image enhancement or the enjoyment of “following the
local team,” and an evaluation of the incidence of the funding mechanisms (taxes and lotteries) used to raise the revenue. One portion of
the redistribution—the consumers’ surplus flowing to fans—seems to
favor relatively more affluent individuals. The remaining aspects of
the redistribution are easier to assess intuitively and support speculation that the public funding of sports facilities redistributes wealth from
individuals with lower and middle incomes to those with much higher
incomes. Whether this redistribution is desirable or not, depends on
one’s views about its fairness and about the assessment of other economic effects of publicly funded stadiums and arenas.

Notes
Siegfried is Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University. Peterson earned Honors
in Economics and graduated with a B.A. from Vanderbilt University in 1998. T. Aldrich Finegan, Malcolm Getz, Allen Sanderson, and Andrew Zimbalist provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. The desired size and amenities of a stadium are also affected by its financing. As
the team’s share of incremental construction cost declines, it will elect a larger
and better outfitted facility.
2. A notable exception is Zimmerman’s (1998) analysis of the distributional consequences of the federal tax exemption for municipal bonds.
3. This count does not include indirect team ownership such as Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corporation’s ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
4. In several of the sports leagues (e.g., NFL, NBA) players share added revenues
with owners on the basis of formulas instituted in conjunction with payroll ceilings that were negotiated between owners and the players’ union.
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5. The relevant net gain to sports ticket buyers is the difference between the consumers’ surplus they enjoy from the opportunity to purchase tickets and what they
would have received from buying the goods and services that would have been
purchased by them were the sporting event tickets not available.
6. About one-fifth of the sample is replaced by new households each quarter so that
after five quarters the entire sample has turned over.
7. Ticket revenues for the four premier league men’s professional team sports in the
U.S. were $2.0 billion in 1996 (Financial World 1996).
8. The out-of-town tickets comprise 28 percent of combined total expenditures on
sporting event tickets and would include tickets purchased to playoff tournaments
and college football bowl games.
9. The difference in means is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level.
10. The topcoding threshold is now at $1 million annual income.
11. This approach was originally suggested to us by Allen Sanderson of the University of Chicago.
12. There are no football games in the sample because the data were collected during
the spring and early summer of 1997.
13. Corporate marketing guides we obtained from the Baltimore Orioles (baseball)
and Chicago Bears (football) reported income distributions of spectators that
imply 1994 median incomes of $53,587 and $43,436, vis-a-vis the income estimates of $34,063 and $40,225, respectively, derived from the targets of game program advertising. Thus, both teams are touting higher incomes for their
customers than any of our estimates.
14. Among the four different sports, ice hockey ticket prices are the highest.
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4
Academics, Athletics,
and Finances
Richard G. Sheehan
University of Notre Dame

In this paper I will present some statistics that attempt to relate collegiate athletics to finances and academics. I will not attempt to delineate the absolute relationship between athletic and financial success.
My goal is more modest. I will be presenting instead some “data suggestions” that hopefully leave you with more questions than you came
with.
Most of the data that I will present come from information released
under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA), or the so-called
Gender Equity reports. Every college that receives federal financial
assistance in any form is now required to provide information relating
to the distribution of a number of athletic variables by gender, including the number of athletes, the amount of financial aid, operating
expenses, and implicitly, profits. These numbers are not without complexities. Each institution has its own accounting procedures, which
typically are employed to facilitate internal decision making and not to
ensure comparability with other academic institutions. Some of the
reported numbers are therefore potentially misleading because of these
accounting conventions. For example, one college might include telephone expenditures by the athletic department as a separate item
charged to the department. Another might aggregate all telephone
expenditures in a general account and may not explicitly charge the
athletic department for its contribution to the overall bill. A few colleges require alumni to contribute a minimum amount like $100 to the
university’s general fund in order to be eligible to purchase football
tickets. If 20,000 alumni make this contribution, $2 million per year is
for the university’s general fund that is really football-generated reve-
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nue. These examples should not lead you to conclude that the Gender
Equity numbers cannot be trusted but rather to conclude that they must
be interpreted with care.
Table 1 contrasts the Big Ten with the Mid-American Conference
(MAC), of which Western Michigan is a member. The top part of the
table presents a mix of statistics on enrollment, athletes, and some
expenditures. The table is configured to present the conference averages, maximum, minimum, and the ratio of the minimum to the maximum. The final column presents the MAC average divided by the Big
Ten average. The ratio of the minimum to the maximum within a conference yields one perspective on the degree of inequality within a conference, the ratio of the MAC to the Big Ten yields a perspective on the
degree of inequality between the two conferences.
In terms of enrollment, the typical Big Ten institution is substantially larger than the typical MAC school; the only exception is Northwestern. The mix of male/female students is roughly similar for the
two conferences. Big Ten schools typically have somewhat larger athletic programs. Despite the larger number of male athletes at Big Ten
institutions, the Big Ten comes closer to meeting Title IX gender
equity guidelines. (An institution can satisfy Title IX if its percentage
of female student-athletes is roughly comparable with its overall percentage of females.) Of Big Ten scholarship athletes, 38.0 percent are
female versus only 33.1 percent of MAC scholarship athletes. That
puts the percentage of female scholarship athletes 11.2 percent below
the percentage of female students at Big Ten schools versus 19.6 percent at MAC schools. This comparison is particularly important for an
individual school because it is one way that a school can certify that it
is in compliance with Title IX.
What causes this greater differential in MAC schools? Certainly
alternative explanations are possible, and I would like to advance two.
First, since Big Ten schools typically are larger, one could argue that
they have access to more students to fill their athletic teams. Thus,
reaching Title IX compliance may be easier for a larger school. A fundamental problem with this explanation, however, is that most scholarship athletes are recruited before they come to college, not from the
student body. The second explanation focuses on the schools’ individual capacities for generating funds to finance Title IX compliance.
Table 1 indicates that the Big Ten generates substantial net revenue

Table 1 The Big Ten versus the Mid-American Conference
Big Ten
Average
Enrollment:

Athletes:

Student aid:

Minimum

Min/max

Average

Maximum

Minimum

MAC avg./
Min/max Big 10 avg.

Male

13,232

18,765

3,734

0.199

8,200

16,708

5,075

0.304

0.620

Female

12.628

18,230

3,870

0.212

8,701

11,470

7,026

0.613

0.689

% Female

49.2

54.4

43.3

0.796

52.8

58.1

34.2

0.589

1.072

Male

378

470

230

0.489

294

389

227

0.584

0.780

Female

234

327

148

0.453

148

194

80

0.412

0.632

% Female

38.0

41.3

30.2

0.729

33.1

40.6

25.8

0.636

0.871

Diff.a

11.2

18.5

5.9

0.317

19.6

27.8

5.1

0.184

1.756

Male

$2,180,218

3,511,825

940,226

0.268

1,293,892

1,841,996

962,659

0.523

0.593

Female

$1,335,507

2,536,923

506,501

0.200

646,408

823,056

443,458

0.539

0.484

% Female
Op. exp:

MAC

Maximum

BBb/men’s
BB/women’s
Football

Total op. exp: Men’s
Men’s sports
excl. football
Women’s

38.0

43.3

33.5

0.774

33.4

37.5

27.6

0.737

0.880

$480,473

1,301,433

209,106

0.161

134,848

274,546

66,404

0.242

0.281

$250,460

510,255

107,587

0.211

77,130

122,165

58,074

0.475

0.308

$1,150,187

2,984,934

337,712

0.113

375,449

679,236

143,629

0.211

0.326

$2,345,423

5,068,365

971,449

0.192

716,258

1,164,957

369,786

0.317

0.305

$1,195,239

2,083,431

633,737

0.304

340,809

485,721

226,157

0.466

0.406

$922,097

1.843.743

474,199

0.257

276,978

476,055

162,984

0.342

0.300
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Big Ten
Average

Maximum

MAC

Minimum Min/max

Minimum

97,263

147,180

55,840

Min/
max

$363,116

490,983

Women

$127,797

176,004

70,505

0.401

32,272

64,995

20,858

0.321

0.253

Salaries

Men

$69,708

88,896

57,920

0.652

49,710

59,656

41,129

0.689

0.713

Women

$47,032

57,467

39,946

0.695

36,231

45,281

28,550

0.631

0.770

$10,763,264 17,840,445

Expense

Men’s BB

Men’s other

Men

$3,373,603

0.379

MAC avg./
Big 10 avg.

Men

Revenue

0.483

Maximum

Recruit exp.

Football

236,941

Average

0.268

6,132,085

0.344

722,893

931,836

496,989

0.533

0.067

5,005,180

2,145,986

0.429

1,607,180

1,945,850

1,291,434

0.663

0.476

(493,397) (1,339,009)

Net

$7,389,661 15,512,024

2,665,632

0.172

(884,286)

2.714

–0.120

Revenue

$4,551,187

6,142,915

3,044,999

0.496

268,220

513,208

115,152

0.224

0.059

Expense

$1,057,599

1,777,364

683,077

0.384

452,225

594,609

324,109

0.545

0.428

Net

$3,493,589

5,459,838

2,226,199

0.408

(184.005)

(35,314)

(325,524)

9.218

–0.053

Revenue

$569,884

2,658,212

15,202

0.006

100,668

364,455

—

0.000

0.177

Expense

$2,244,463

3,329,909

1,568,489

0.471

884,143

1,411,663

537,871

0.381

0.394

Net

($1,674,579)

Revenue

$17,530,360 26,017,272 12,143,588

246,513 (2,839,902) (11.520)

(783,475)

(469,230) (1,298,749)

2.768

0.468

0.467

1,158,998

1,433,468

698,288

0.487

0.066

2,979,663

3,437,448

Expense

$7,626,141 12,919,483

4,820,083

0.373

2,205,850

0.642

0.391

Net

$9,904,220 19,655,268

3,540,421

0.180 (1,820,666) (1,133,421) (2,328,427)

2.054

–0.184

Women

Revenue
Expense

Overall

3,064,266

24,697

$3,440,546

4,976,973

2,542,494

Net

($2,661,190)

Revenue

$22,901,272 35,887,000 13,419,690

Expense

$19,448,095 36,302,000

Net
Revenue (%) Football

Cost (%)

$779,356

(924,360) (4,685,316)

7,391,879

$3,413,177 18,730,905 (2,755,305)

0.008

37,915

78,808

780

0.511

1,328,315

1,657,012

0.010

0.049

846,228

0.511

0.386

5.069 (1,290,401)

(839,690) (1,586,915)

1.890

0.485

0.374

3,961,769

7,641,186

1,313,574

0.172

0.173

0.204

5,781,812

7,455,973

4,466,822

0.599

0.297

185,213 (3,998,809) –21.590

–0.533

(0.147) (1,820,043)

47.6

62.9

37.4

33.4

64.9

6.5

Football + BB

69.7

99.4

53.0

52.6

99.9

12.1

Football

17.3

13.8

29.0

27.8

26.1

28.9

Football + BB

22.7

18.7

38.3

35.6

34.1

36.2

a

The “average” columns show the difference between the percentage of females enrolled and the percentage of females who are athletes. The
“min/max” columns show the ratio of the maximum and minimum values for this difference.
b
BB = basketball
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from its football and men’s basketball programs and the MAC generates relatively little net revenue from these sports. Thus, the Big Ten
has a ready source of funds for subsidizing women’s sports and complying with Title IX. One could argue that it is substantially easier for
the Big Ten to be able to afford to comply with the law. The data do
not prove that contention, but they certainly appear to suggest it.
Following the statistics on athletes in Table 1 are statistics on student aid, operating expenses for three sports (men’s basketball,
women’s basketball, and football), total operating expenses for men’s
and women’s sports, recruitment expenditures, and salaries. These
numbers suggest two basic conclusions.
Looking at the last column, the MAC average is consistently a
small fraction of the Big Ten average. The average coach’s salary in
the MAC is about 75 percent of his or her Big Ten counterpart’s.
Recruiting expenses are only 25 percent as high. Student aid is about
50 percent of the Big Ten average, and total operating expenditures are
roughly 30 percent of the Big Ten average. Thus, I have a very simple
question. Does anyone believe that across the board, year-in and yearout, the MAC can compete with the Big Ten? The expenditure numbers suggest that the playing field is not level and that when MAC
schools play Big Ten schools, you should expect a mismatch. Now one
might be tempted to argue that the discrepancy in expenses is only in
Big Ten football. Unfortunately, that is far from the case. MAC
expenditures for female teams are also only 30 percent of those in the
Big Ten. You might alternately argue that higher Big Ten expenditures
reflect their greater number of athletes and, therefore, more teams.
That also is far from the case. On a per athlete basis, MAC expenditures are still less than 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures.
Why do we observe a discrepancy between Big Ten and MAC
expenditures? There are many hypotheses. Big Ten institutions may
have more legislative clout. They typically have more alumni. They
generally have longer athletic traditions. They may place greater
emphasis on intercollegiate athletics. Regardless of these hypotheses,
we will see in the bottom half of Table 1 that Big Ten schools definitely
generate more athletic revenue. I will leave it to you to postulate which
reasons are more important.
The second half of Table 1 presents revenues and expenses for various sports and categories, as well as for the overall athletic program.
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Perhaps the most dramatic difference is in terms of football programs.
The typical MAC football program is but a shadow of the typical Big
Ten program. It is important to note, however, that athletic expenditures at the typical MAC institution are roughly 50 percent of those at a
Big Ten school, but MAC revenues are less than 10 percent of the Big
Ten average. Why the dramatic difference? Again, the numbers are
suggestive but not definitive. One could argue that the marginal expenditures of the Big Ten so elevate their programs that they obtain the
best athletes and coaches and can produce the best product, which is
then marketed for millions of dollars in packed stadiums. Alternatively, one could argue that the tradition of the Big Ten has elevated the
programs and generated their financial success. Or one could argue
that the prior financial success of the Big Ten has bred a tradition that
generates further financial and on-the-field success. In any event, the
bottom line is that Big Ten football is a very lucrative endeavor on
average, while MAC football is not.
Comparing averages in the Big Ten and the MAC, however, masks
one other important difference in the conferences. There is much
greater variation in the Big Ten than in the MAC in terms of football
profitability. MAC losses range from $0.5 million to $1.4 million, a
span of less than $1 million. In contrast, Big Ten profits range from
$15.5 million to $2.7 million. There are a few teams that dominate Big
Ten football profits: Michigan, Ohio State, and Penn State. On a yearin and year-out basis, these same teams are also at the top of the rankings, and one might readily argue that the correlation is not an accident. Three schools dominate Big Ten football profits and victories
while no school dominates MAC football profits (or smallest financial
losses) or victories. It appears then that rough financial parity has produced approximate on-the-field parity as well.
For men’s basketball, the story is virtually identical to men’s football. The only difference is the magnitude of the numbers. MAC
expenditures run almost 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures, but revenues are less than 10 percent of the Big Ten’s. The good news for
MAC basketball is that, on average, MAC schools almost break even.
For other men’s sports (so-called Olympic sports or nonrevenue
sports), the situation changes dramatically. All schools in the Big Ten
and the MAC lose money on these programs; the only difference is the
magnitude of the losses. MAC schools spend only about 40 percent of
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what Big Ten schools spend. The revenues in all cases are trivial compared with the size of the athletic budget. The good news for the MAC
is that it loses much less money in nonrevenue sports than the Big Ten.
The bad news for the MAC is that it loses less money because it spends
less, and one might reasonably project that spending less means winning less.
Given the substantial financial losses shown in Table 1 for other
men’s sports, one might reasonably ask why schools spend so heavily
on these programs? One possible answer is that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) requires a school to offer a minimum number of sports programs to field a Division IA football
program, but that minimum does not appear to be a binding constraint
on schools in the Big Ten or the MAC. Why, then, do they spend? If
they lose money and if they are not required to keep at least some of
these programs, why offer them? The acceptance of financial loss in
these programs suggests that the entertainment value placed on them is
higher. (One might argue that there is an educational value as well, but
that argument would be more appropriate for intramural activities than
for intercollegiate sports.)
Men’s programs (all sports combined) generally are profitable in
the Big Ten but not in the MAC. The logic is simple. In the Big Ten,
football profits in particular make men’s programs in general profitable. In the MAC, no football profits exist to offset other losses.
For women’s sports, the story is similar to that for men’s sports
other than football and men’s basketball. Expenses are higher in the
Big Ten than in the MAC, and revenues for both are but a fraction of
expenses. (Women’s revenues, however, are dramatically higher in the
Big Ten.) Once again, financial losses are lower in the MAC, but that
simply reflects the lower expenses. Returning to Title IX, Big Ten
schools fit the model frequently advanced that football “pays the bills”
and allows schools to offer a wide-ranging women’s athletics program.
However, MAC schools dramatically contradict that model because
there are no football profits to offset other losses. In fact, the MAC
schools face even greater difficulties in complying with Title IX. That
is, total men’s losses average $1.9 million, and total women’s losses
are only $0.8 million. In the case of schools with roughly 50 percent
female students, an economist might argue that the financial subsidies
to men’s and women’s programs should be approximately equal to
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meet the spirit of Title IX. The numbers in Table 1 suggest that could
be done in alternative ways, for example, spending $1.1 million more
on women’s sports. However, all alternatives would impose potentially
severe constraints on MAC schools because they lack financial
resources.
The last four rows in Table 1 show the percentage of total revenues
and expenses stemming from football and from football plus men’s
basketball, the two generally perceived “cash cows” of intercollegiate
athletics. Institutional vagaries distort the maximums and minimums
here, but the averages are revealing and suggest that football and men’s
basketball do generate the majority of revenues. However, although
football programs in particular are perceived to be “gold-plated”—getting the most expensive versions of everything—the self-reported
accounting numbers suggest that football does not comprise the majority of costs. The averages suggest that football and men’s basketball do
generate the majority of revenues, but they are not responsible for a
majority of the expenditures.
Table 2 presents data from a more aggregate perspective. Rather
than considering only the Big Ten and the MAC, Table 2 presents more
limited summary information for all Division IA schools.1 In general,
the results are consistent with those in Table 1. Football and men’s
basketball are profitable, but other men’s sports and women’s sports
Table 2 Revenues and Expenditures at Division IA Schools
Football

Men’s
Other men’s Women’s
basketball
sports
sports

Division IA schools
Revenue ($, millions)

6.27

2.40

0.24

0.59

Expense ($, millions)

3.26

1.02

1.28

2.42

Mean profit ($, millions)

3.01

1.38

–1.05

–1.83

Median profit ($, millions)

1.17

0.75

–0.98

–1.68

Reporting profit

71

75

3

4

Actual profit

38

61

0

0

Division IA schools with a profit

SOURCE: Gender equity reports.
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are not. The table reports both mean and median profits, because the
distribution of football profits—and to a lesser extent the distributions
of revenues and expenditures—is not a normal or bell-shaped distribution. A few schools make sizable profits like Michigan, Ohio State,
and Penn State in the Big Ten. However, a small army of schools
either barely break even or lose money, like all schools in the MAC.
The mean profits of $3 million for football gives a misleading picture
of the actual profit position of the typical Division IA institution, for
which the median profit is only about $1.2 million.
Even that last number is misleading. The EADA reports from
which these statistics are derived refer only to operating costs. Other
costs such as debt service and administrative overhead can easily run in
excess of $1 million. Thus, actual profits are likely much closer to zero
than reported profits at the typical institution. For the Michigans and
Ohio States, subtracting even $2 million in omitted costs only slightly
changes the degree to which the football program is lucrative. For
schools at the median, however, $1 million in increased costs dramatically changes reported profits.
The last rows in Table 2 indicate the number of programs reporting
profits and the programs actually having profits after making adjustments for accounting peculiarities, debt service, and administrative
overhead. The EADA reports suggest that about 75 percent of the 99
schools with complete reports make a profit in both football and men’s
basketball, and almost none make a profit in other men’s programs or
in women’s programs. After adjusting the numbers to reflect all costs,
however, the percentages with a profit drops to less than 50 percent in
football, roughly 60 percent in men’s basketball, and 0 percent in either
other men’s sports or in women’s sports. The implication? Institutions
that have large sports programs should receive substantial nonfinancial
utility from those programs to make the expenditures worthwhile, or
should at least believe that those programs and their publicity create
additional student applications and a larger or higher-quality student
body.
Table 2 presents a snapshot in time of the distribution of profits at
Division IA football schools. How have profits changed over time?
Focusing on football and men’s basketball, the only programs with
profits, the growth rate in average profits from 1983 to 1996 has been
about 7.6 percent per year. This increase appears to be substantial and
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suggests that profits might improve dramatically even at institutions
now currently suffering substantial losses. Unfortunately, that growth
in profits has been highly uneven both over time and among institutions. In some years, profits at Division IA football schools have
grown over 20 percent, and in other years they have actually decreased.
In addition, profits at schools like Michigan have increased substantially while losses at MAC schools have shown no sign of abating.
Table 3 shows mean profits by conference as well as the 11 most
profitable football and men’s basketball programs. The numbers suggest that the best conferences do very well. The Southeastern Conference (SEC) and the Big Ten average profits of $8.6 million and $7.4
million, respectively, in football. In basketball, the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) joins them at the top. Again, it should be clear that
some conferences—and by extension some schools—do very well,
while others are engaged in a continuing financial struggle. Given the
caveats mentioned already, it would appear that the Big Ten and the
SEC as a whole are in strong shape. The ACC, Big East, Big 12, and
Pacific–10 Conference (PAC) are generally surviving while the Western Athletic, USA, and Mid-American conferences are struggling to
stay afloat. Again, I must note that some schools in almost every conference are doing well while others are not.
Table 4 presents profits of the 11 most profitable collegiate football
and men’s basketball programs. Arguably, the rankings are suspect
because of institutional accounting inconsistencies. However, the
results suggest certain points. First, some schools are very financially
successful. The table includes representatives of the PAC (1), the SEC
(5), the Big Ten (3), the Big 12 (1), and an independent. You might
argue that Michigan or Notre Dame or Tennessee deserves to be ranked
much higher, and I would not argue with you. Nevertheless, the point
is that the most profitable football schools generate substantial revenue—even though their overall net revenues from football are relatively small. Second, looking at the list of most profitable football
schools, one cannot avoid a comparison with the more traditional top
25 rankings; in particular, every school on the list is a regular in the top
25. Is that an accident? I sincerely doubt it. But the numbers—and
the presumed correlation—cannot indicate causation. That is, does
winning generate profits? Or does generating profits allow you to keep
on winning? I will come back to this point shortly.
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Table 3 Mean Profits by Conferencea
Football
($, millions)

Men’s basketball
($, millions)

Southeastern

8.60

2.60

Big Ten

7.39

3.49

Pacific–10

4.78

1.44

Big 12

3.46

1.26

Big East

3.09

0.81

Atlantic Coast

2.49

2.79

Western Atlantic

0.22

0.48

Conference USA

–0.70

1.19

Mid-American

–0.79

–0.20

Conference

a

All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and revenue data in compliance with the Higher Education Act. All data are self-reported.

Table 4 The Eleven Most Profitable Programsa
Football
Rank

a

School

Men’s basketball

Profits
($, millions)
20.3

School
Louisville

Profits
($, millions)

1

Washington

6.9

2

Florida

19.8

Arkansas

6.1

3

Auburn

16.8

Indiana

5.5

4

Penn State

15.5

North Carolina

5.4

5

Georgia

14.3

Arizona

5.3

6

Michigan

12.1

Kentucky

4.7

7

Alabama

12.1

Ohio State

4.6

8

Notre Dame

11.6

Iowa

4.1

9

Tennessee

11.3

Nebraska

4.1

10

Texas A&M

10.4

Florida State

3.8

11

Ohio State

10.2

Michigan

3.7

All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and revenue data in compliance with the Higher Education Act. All data are self-reported.

The Economics of Sports

87

The numbers in Table 4 also agree with those in Table 1 and show
that football schools do not compete on a level field. In fact, no school
from a “mid-major” or lower-rated conference appears on either top
ten list. (One might argue that Louisville’s ranking at the top of the
men’s basketball list is a contradiction. However, I would also argue
that Louisville’s ranking is likely boosted by institutional accounting
since its EADA report indicates revenues almost $600,000 more than
Kentucky’s, a similar but potentially richer program, and costs less
than 60 percent of Kentucky’s.) Can a school other than a traditional
power crack the top 10? The numbers suggest that it is dramatically
easier for an institution like East Carolina or UNLV to break into the
top echelon on the field than it is to break into the top tier in profits.
Let me next briefly address the question of causation. Does winning generate profits, for example? The evidence again must be
viewed as suggestive rather than definitive. Statistical analysis (regression) of revenues does not indicate any strong relationship. In particular, it appears that winning more football games does not increase
revenue but that a higher poll ranking does marginally improve profits.
While that finding may appear contradictory, it should not be entirely
unexpected. If Western Michigan and Michigan both win one additional game, will the win work to increase their revenues? The statistical answer is probably no. However, if Michigan is ranked slightly
higher in the polls, will the elevated ranking increase its revenues? The
statistical answer is likely yes. (One should also note that winning
more would mean a higher ranking, so there could be a more indirect
relationship between winning and revenues.) It might not be possible
for Michigan to sell any additional tickets because they generally play
before a full house. However, the school may become eligible for a
better bowl or receive additional television revenue.
In terms of causation, what may be the most interesting result is
that revenues appear to be largely driven by expenses. Based on the
results shown in the previous tables, this interaction should come as no
surprise. However, the question really should be about the magnitude
of the increase in revenues. That is, if a school increases expenditures
by $1, should it expect to increase revenues by more or less than $1?
The answer to this question varies dramatically by sport. For other
men’s and women’s sports, a $1 increase in expenditures increases revenues by $0.25 to $0.35 (Sheehan 2000). The implication? If a school
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wants to spend more money on these programs, it should feel free to do
that, but it should not expect to earn its money back in increased revenues. For football, a $1 increase in expenditures generates approximately $1 in additional revenue (Sheehan 2000). The implication? If a
school wants to keep throwing money at football, on average it will be
no worse off with revenues increasing with expenditures. Thus, any
incentive to follow this strategy must be based on a desire to win rather
than a desire to make money.
The most interesting case is men’s basketball, for which each $1
increase in expenditures is expected to produce approximately $2 in
additional revenue (Sheehan 2000). This result may initially appear
surprising, but I contend it is quite consistent with developments in
Division I basketball. If schools generally observe that basketball
expenditures are profitable, then they should invest in their basketball
programs. The NCAA has myriad restrictions limiting institutions
from simply dropping buckets of money into any sports program.
However, the NCAA has few restrictions on schools adding basketball
programs. The result? Almost 100 institutions have moved to Division
I in basketball, arguably because they are investing in their basketball
programs.
Finally, in terms of causation, one could ask whether schools use
football revenues to subsidize other sports programs? (I focus on football rather than men’s basketball because few schools generate enough
net revenue from basketball to contribute appreciable subsidies to other
sports programs.) The results suggest that higher net football revenue
is associated with higher expenses in other men’s and women’s programs. For each $1 increase in football net revenue, regression results
suggest that other men’s expenditures rise by about $0.10 and women’s
expenditures rise by about $0.20 (Sheehan 2000). These numbers have
two implications. First, although the values sound very small, top programs like Penn State share substantial additional revenues with
women’s sports. In fact, its football profits of $15.5 million give Penn
State’s women’s sports about $3 million more to spend. Of course,
there is also a downside. For a program like Tulane that lost $3.3 million on football, women’s expenditures would be predicted to be down
about $0.6 million. Second, if for each dollar of football net revenue,
$0.10 goes to other men’s sports and $0.20 goes to women’s sports,
where does the other $0.70 go? The answer, assuming no increase in

Graduation
Big Ten
Division IA
10th
rates
average
average
percentile
All students
71.1
58.6
36.0
Athletes
67.7
58.6
40.5
All students
Black/M
45.4
39.3
18.0
White/M
71.4
57.9
34.0
Total/M
69.7
56.1
32.3
Black/F
52.5
48.1
26.0
White/F
74.5
63.0
41.2
Total/F
72.6
61.1
38.6
Athletes
Black/M
49.4
43.2
23.0
White/M
66.5
57.7
40.2
Total/M
62.2
53.3
34.4
Black/F
66.8
62.5
33.0
White/F
82.0
70.1
52.4
Total/F
79.4
68.8
51.2
Football
Black
51.8
43.9
20.0
White
71.0
61.9
46.0
Total
62.0
53.1
36.0
a Values calculated using data in “Division IA average” column.
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Table 5 Graduation Rates (1997)
90th
percentile
83.6
76.4

MAC
average
53.0
60.7

MAC avg./
Big Ten
0.745
0.897

Athletes/all
studentsa

65.8
84.8
82.7
69.8
88.0
84.7

32.2
51.4
50.3
38.4
56.4
55.1

0.710
0.720
0.721
0.731
0.757
0.759

67.8
75.0
74.4
92.0
88.0
87.0

43.0
59.7
56.6
60.3
69.6
68.4

0.871
0.897
0.910
0.902
0.849
0.862

1.099
0.997
0.950
1.300
1.112
1.125

66.0
79.0
76.0

46.5
63.7
56.8

0.897
0.897
0.916

1.118
1.070
0.948

0.999
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administrative overhead, is that it would go back to the general fund of
the institution. That is, colleges that have football profits are using
those profits to subsidize the academic enterprise.
To this point I have said very little about academics, despite the
title of this paper, which places academics first. Table 5 presents some
statistics on graduation rates, which, although far from the only measure of academic performance, are the only readily available measure.
Table 5 presents Big Ten and MAC average graduation rates as well as
the average rates for all Division IA football schools and for the 10th
and 90th percentiles. The table presents the graduation rates of the
general student body and of athletes by sex and race. The last column
shows that athletes—even football players—graduate at roughly the
same rate as other students. In general, this is good news. (Basketball
players, however, do not graduate at the same rate as the general student population.) Before any congratulations are handed out to football players and other athletes, however, a strong word of caution is in
order. Athletes toil under substantial additional constraints because
they must spend many hours in training or in sometimes intense competition. Critics of the current grant-in-aid system label their efforts
“work” rather than athletics. Offsetting this cost, however, are some
substantial benefits. In particular, athletes’ grants-in-aid allow them to
be full-time students without the distraction—at least until recently—
of working to fund their tuition or board. In addition, they frequently
have additional academic advantages, such as tutors who are not available to or are very expensive for a typical student. Thus, one might ask
whether we should expect athletes to graduate at a higher rate than the
student body in general.
Another frequently expressed concern is that major athletic programs place more emphasis on winning than studying and thus the
most stress on student-athletes—or perhaps more accurately, on athlete-students. The results in Table 5, however, suggest that there is no
support for this concern. If athletic competition were too stressful, we
should expect to see lower graduation rates in the Big Ten than in the
MAC. But, although the rates are close, Big Ten athletes have graduation rates that are slightly higher than those in the MAC. This result
should not be surprising, however, given the results already presented.
The Big Ten has dramatically more financial resources than the MAC.
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To the extent that Big Ten schools value high graduation rates, they
clearly have the ability to provide the resources to achieve that goal.
In summary, what should you conclude based on these statistics? I
would argue that there are three general conclusions. First, athletic
success and financial success are intimately related. Big-time schools
with tradition and reputation may make money with their athletic programs; others do not. Furthermore, a “have-not” school has virtually
no chance of changing (unless it cheats, but that is another story). Second, athletic programs generally cross-subsidize within their campuses. That is, the schools that make money can and do use those
profits to improve nonrevenue sports as well as the institution’s general
academic program. However, the many schools with losses in their
athletic programs are effectively using revenue generated from the academic arena to subsidize sports. There may well be a sound logic for
this subsidy, but academics should insist that it be justified explicitly.
Third, the academic enterprise is relatively insulated from the athletic
enterprise except for what is often a relatively small financial link.
Anecdotal evidence such as stories of the so-called “Flutie effect,” in
which applications double after a stunning athletic event, also link athletics to academics. However, the statistical evidence of any link is less
than overwhelming. That should not imply that academics can safely
ignore the athletic enterprise. It does, however, suggest that the athletic enterprise is likely to neither save nor destroy an institution.

Note
1. Table 2 excludes institutions not providing complete information: Boise State,
Boston College, Houston, Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Rice, and Syracuse. In
addition, it excludes the three service academies because they do not award athletic scholarships, and all students attending the academies receive full scholarship assistance.
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5
Economic Issues in the
1998–1999 NBA Lockout and the
Problem of Competitive Balance
in Professional Sports
Andrew Zimbalist
Smith College

The central problem of any professional team sports league is different from that of a typical industry. On the one hand, the National
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL),
the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball (MLB)
and Major League Soccer (MLS) are each monopolies. On the other
hand, unlike other monopolies, teams within each league compete on
the playing field, but cooperate as businesses off the field. 1 Unlike
General Motors and Chrysler, the Boston Red Sox would not benefit if
competition drove the New York Yankees out of business. In fact,
sports leagues need to cooperate in maintaining a certain level of competitive balance among their teams to preserve and enhance fan interest. That is, teams must be sufficiently equal in ability to ensure that
the outcome of the games and season are in question.
The problem that professional sports leagues face in the 21st century is how to achieve this competitive balance when some teams represent cities that are eight times larger than the cities of their competitors,
some teams play in state-of-the-art facilities and others do not, and
some teams are owned by individuals or companies who potentially
benefit from significant synergies between the team and their other
businesses. While competitive balance is a longstanding problem in
professional sports, it has taken on new dimensions since the advent of
free agency in 1976, the introduction of the modern sports facility of the
1990s (which can increase team revenues by $20–$50 million or more a
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year), and the growing penetration of the ranks of team ownership by
major media conglomerates.
Five strategies can be employed to address the problem of competitive balance:
1) Artificially restrict the growth of player salaries,
2) Introduce or increase revenue sharing among the teams with
each league,
3) Further skew the reverse order draft of amateur players to favor
low-revenue or low-rent clubs,2
4) Allow freer team movement among cities,3 or
5) Compel league divestiture and engender competition.
The NBA lockout of 1998–1999 is an example of the first strategy,
but the NBA already had a powerful mechanism to promote competitive balance in their league and the owners tried to eliminate it both in
1995 and in 1998. Thus, as I shall argue, contrary to the basketball
owners’ rhetoric about their concern for financially weak teams, their
lockout was really just a bold attempt to boost profit margins.

BACKGROUND TO THE NBA LOCKOUT
In 1983, when free agency in professional sports was not yet a
decade old, NBA Commissioner David Stern convinced NBA players’
union director Larry Fleisher that NBA franchises were financially
fragile and needed a salary cap to be economically viable. The cap was
defined as 53 percent of defined gross revenues (DGR), which included
only television, radio, and gate revenues. Both sides, however, agreed
that the 53 percent should not be a hard cap and established certain
exceptions that would allow teams to spend above the cap limit.
One such exception is called the “Larry Bird exception.” This
exception allows a team to re-sign one of its own players at any salary,
regardless of whether the team has room under its salary cap to do so.
For example, if the Chicago Bulls had spent $28 million on its first 11
players for 1998–1999 and Michael Jordan had changed his mind and
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decided to come back, even with the 1998–1999 team salary cap at $30
million the Bulls could have paid Jordan anything it wanted. 4 Without
the exception, the Bulls could only pay Jordan the salary left under the
cap, or $2 million.
Three characteristics of the Bird exception appealed to owners.
First, giving teams an advantage in re-signing their own players meant
that the roster would be more stable, and the owners believed that this
stability would strengthen fan identification with the team. Second,
together with the reverse-order draft (wherein teams at the bottom of
the standings have earlier picks in the amateur draft each year), the
Bird exception provided a hefty fillip to league competitive balance.
Because the original signing team has a substantial advantage in
re-signing its own free agents, superstar players signed out of college
generally remain with their first team throughout their professional
careers. In 1997–1998, 7 of the 11 top-paid players in the NBA still
played for their original teams. Thus, if Michael Jordan had originally
signed with Milwaukee or Utah instead of Chicago, he probably would
have played in those cities throughout his career. The Bird exception,
then, is a powerful force preventing the rich teams from accumulating
all the best players.
This observation is reinforced by the weak statistical correlation
between team salaries and team win percentage in the NBA since the
introduction of the salary cap. Using annual data for 1984–1985
through 1997–1998, the coefficient of determination between these
two variables is between 0.30 and 0.40 in only 2 of the 14 years,
between 0.20 and 0.30 in 5 of the years, between 0.10 and 0.20 in 5
other years, and below 0.10 in 2 of the years.5
Third, the Bird exception with the salary cap still provides a break
on superstar salaries relative to a more open system of free agency.
This is because most teams will not have enough room under their cap
to bid effectively for a superstar. The star player, then, generally will
not receive competitive bids for his services and will not necessarily
end up where his marginal revenue product is the highest. If the Bird
exception was the price the owners had to pay to get the union to agree
to a cap system, then it was a price well worth paying.
Both sides agreed that the Bird exception was an ingenious and
productive institution for the NBA until the 1995 negotiations, when
the owners called for its elimination. In 1995, with average player sal-
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aries at $1.44 million and with Simon Gourdine installed as the players’ union (NBPA) director, the owners saw an opportunity to slow
down salary growth. Gourdine, oddly enough, had worked as an executive in the NBA’s central office between 1970 and 1981, the last seven
of those years as deputy commissioner. Gourdine acceded to major
concessions proposed by Commissioner Stern, only to provoke a
player movement to decertify the union. Eventually, the players
accepted a deal that gave the owners a three-year rookie salary scale, as
well as new restrictions on free agents, and eliminated a middle-range
salary exception. The Bird exception was preserved, albeit somewhat
weakened. The decertification drive had badly divided the players, the
agents, and the union. When it was all over, the player representatives
to the union voted to oust Gourdine in February 1996. Several months
later he was replaced by Billy Hunter.
In spite of these changes, league revenues and player salaries grew
handsomely in the ensuing three years. With payrolls growing faster,
the salary share of basketball-related income (BRI)6 rose from 53 percent in 1995–1996, to 55 percent in 1996–1997, to 57 percent in 1997–
1998.7 This growth, of course, was acceptable to the players, but they
were concerned that, with the elimination of a middle-salary exception 8
in the 1995 agreement, salaries were becoming too stratified. Despite
the growth in the average salary to $2.4 million in 1997–1998, 9
between 1995–1996 and 1997–1998, the number of players earning the
minimum salary almost doubled to 60 and the number earning less
than $1 million grew to 151.
The owners’ concerns were different. Individual salaries were hitting unprecedented peaks, and some young stars who had scarcely
demonstrated their potential value were receiving long-term, mega-salary contracts. As a consequence, the players’ salary share was increasing and the owners saw no end to this growth. Further, the owners
knew that a) the union still had some scars from its bitter internal battles in 1995; b) the union had a new director who had no direct experience in collective bargaining; c) growing salary stratification could
further undermine union solidarity; and d) strong, ongoing revenue
growth allowed the owners to offer the players absolute salary growth
even with a decreasing share of the total pie. The owners again saw an
opportunity to restrain salary growth and they seized it. On July 1,
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1998, the owners imposed a lockout. One of the owners’ demands was
that the Bird exception be eliminated.

ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE LOCKOUT
The owners claimed that the league had become unprofitable and
that more than half the teams lost money in 1997–1998. However, the
players were never given detailed team financial statements for 1997–
1998 to allow them to confirm this extravagant claim. But they did
receive this information for 1996–1997 and previous years. The union
hired Stanford economist Roger Noll to decode the books. Based on
Noll’s work, the union concluded that no more than four or five teams
out of 29 actually lost money in 1996–1997.
To understand the union’s suspicion about ownership accounting
practices, it is instructive to review some collective bargaining history
in the NBA. Following the 1988 collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), which defined DGR as revenues derived from, related to or
arising out of the performance of players in NBA basketball “games,” a
dispute arose over what sources of income should be included. 10 Owners divided luxury suite revenue into two parts: the rental payment for
the comfort and convenience of the suite and the ticket price for watching the game. The owners claimed that the latter belonged to DGR and
the former did not. This and similar issues led the players to bring an
arbitration complaint against the owners, which they eventually won in
1992 for a settlement of some $60 million.
When the 1995 CBA was signed, DGR was changed to BRI and the
players accepted a lower share (48.04 percent) in return for a broader
definition of revenues applicable to the cap. The 1995 BRI included all
basketball income except naming rights, 60 percent of signage and luxury box revenues, certain property income, and part of related-party
income.
The 1995 CBA took 11 pages to define BRI, and it was still subject
to regular disputation. Suppose you are an owner negotiating an arena
lease and are given a choice: pay $2 million in rent and receive 50 percent of a projected $4 million in signage income or pay no rent and
receive no signage. It might seem that this is a choice between equals,
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but since the CBA gives 40 percent of signage income to the players,
the owner would do better with the second option of no rent/no signage. Lease agreements offer manifold opportunities for such juggling,
especially when the arena and team are owned by the same person or
entity.
Related-party transactions are a central component of the finances
for most teams. If the owner of the team also owns the arena, the arena
management company, the concessionaire rights, a local TV or radio
station, Web pages, local real estate, law, or consulting firms that do
business with the team, then the owner has tremendous latitude about
where to make his or her profits appear. Abe Pollin, for example, owns
the new MCI Center in Washington, D.C., where both his NBA and
NHL teams, the Washington Wizards and Capitals, play. He can retain
arena revenue from naming rights, premium seats, signage, catering,
and theme activities in his arena corporation, thereby reducing the revenues earned by his teams by tens of millions of dollars annually.
Almost half of all NBA team owners also own their facilities while
several others own companies that have management contracts for their
arenas.
Owners can also pay themselves exorbitant salaries and consulting
fees as well as receive extensive perquisites. They can choose to capitalize their franchises through owner loans rather than paid-in capital
and take their returns in the form of interest income (which shows up
as costs on the team ledgers) rather than profits. Thus, Wayne Huizenga, owner of the Marlins (until February 1999), Dolphins, Panthers,
Pro Player Stadium, Sports Channel Florida, and arena management
and concessionaire ventures, could rechannel his teams’ revenues to
his other related businesses, making the 1997 world champion Marlins
appear to lose money.11
In leagues where there is a salary cap, such accounting legerdemain comes in handy to reduce player payrolls. Where there is no cap,
owners have still preferred to hide profits to reduce revenue-sharing
payments or to argue for larger public stadium subsidies, collective
bargaining concessions or special treatment under the law.
So, when the NBPA reviewed the teams’ pre-1997 financial
records, it could not discover a basis for the owners’ claims of declining profits. The few teams that lost money in 1996–1997 generally did
not have losses in prior years. Moreover, each of these teams would
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have a new arena to play in within two years. New arenas usually raise
a team’s revenues by $20–$30 million a year. Moreover, the NBA had
signed a new four-year television contract with NBC and Turner that
would begin with the 1998–1999 season and increase the average
annual payout per team from a guaranteed $9.5 million to a guaranteed
$22.8 million. Thus, even if four or five teams had true financial difficulties in 1996–1997, it seemed that new arenas and television money
would wash away their problems.
The NBPA also wondered why the owners were so alarmed that
player salaries had increased to 57 percent of BRI. By comparison, the
NFL was using a different, narrower revenue concept and setting its
salary cap at 63 percent of defined revenues. But the NFL cap also had
loopholes, albeit fewer than the NBA’s, and its salaries frequently rose
to 70 percent of defined revenues. If the NFL’s defined revenue concept were converted to the NBA’s BRI, the salary share in the NFL
would have hovered around 60 percent in recent years. In Major
League Baseball (MLB), the comparable player share was also around
60 percent, excluding the additional 12 percent that the teams spend on
their player development systems. (For the NBA, the latter is an
expense that is borne almost entirely by college basketball programs.) 12
Furthermore, an NBA team played half the number of games as an
MLB team, had half the number of players for whom it has to pay for
travel, lodging and meals, has fewer coaches, smaller facilities and less
equipment. Therefore, could not NBA teams still be profitable with
player shares around 60 percent?
Other facts as well undermine the owners’ claim to dwindling
profits. The NBA lavishes alluring sums on its coaches and front office
personnel. In 1997–1998, Commissioner David Stern reportedly
earned $8 million a year, far in excess of his counterparts in the other
sports. The salaries of head coaches and general managers more than
tripled between 1994–1995 and 1997–1998. Fourteen head coaches
received over $2.8 million a year, with one coach’s salary reaching up
to $8 million. In contrast, the three highest paid coaches in the NFL
each earned under $2.5 million a year, although each had won a Super
Bowl. Asked to comment about the astronomical increases in NBA
coaches’ salaries, David Stern commented to the Web site Sportsline
USA: “If the owners spend all that money on coaches, that means they
have it. Otherwise, they wouldn’t do it.”
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Consider what would happen to NBA profitability if the players
salary share remained at 57 percent. In its December 14, 1998 issue
(p. 130), Forbes magazine estimated that the average NBA team
earned $6.6 million in profits during 1997–1998.13 To be conservative,
let us take half of this figure and round down and, thus, assume that
the average profits were only $3 million. The average team, then,
would have financial results that looked something like this in 1997–
1998:
Team revenues = $60 million
Player salaries = $34 million
Other costs = $23 million
Profit = $3 million
Now assume, as the NBA did in its projections, that revenues grow
at 12 percent annually. For player salaries to retain their 57 percent
share, they would also have to grow at 12 percent.
The owners had long argued to the players that they needed artificial constraints on salary growth because they were unable to behave
rationally given the pressure they are under from the fans and the
media to sign the best players. That is, they need protection from
themselves when it comes to player salaries. Granting the owners this
dubious premise, it certainly cannot also apply to their other expenses.
Costs like plane travel, hotels, arena maintenance, front office personnel, and coaching staff should more or less follow the underlying rate
of inflation. Let us generously assume that the “other costs” category
will grow at 5 percent annually, approximately two times the current
rate of inflation. Now, consider what would happen to profits under
this scenario. As the share of player salaries stays the same, the share
of other costs falls rapidly and, hence, the share of profits rises. As the
share of profits in revenue grows, and revenues grow at 12 percent,
absolute profits exhibit explosive growth. By the year 2002–2003, the
average team would have these results:
Team revenues = $105.8 million
Player salaries = $59.9 million
Other costs = $29.3 million
Profits = $16.6 million
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That is, profits would grow more than fivefold over the period; the
annual growth rate of profits would be 40.8 percent!
Would $16.6 million represent a fair return for a team owner? On
revenues of $105.8, this is a 15.7 percent return. This is approximately
three times the average, pretax rate of return on revenues in the leisuretime industry in the United States between 1990 and 1997 of 5.8 percent.14 Even if we assumed that in 1997–1998 the average NBA team
earned zero profits (instead of $3 million) and other costs were $26
million (instead of $23 million), at the assumed rates of growth, average team profits in 2002–2003 would be $12.6 million, or 11.9 percent
of revenues.
It is, of course, theoretically possible that even with such strong
average profits, the distribution of profits might be so unequal as to
leave a handful of teams in financial difficulty. However, with the new
arenas projected for the bottom teams and the nearly two-and-a-half
fold increase in the national television contract, which is divided
equally among all teams, it is likely that even the financial bottom
dwellers would have acceptable rates of return.
If some teams had true financial problems, then the players’ association believed that they should have been addressed through additional revenue sharing among the owners rather than through new
artificial restraints on salaries. Unlike the NFL or MLB, the NBA
does not share any local revenues. The NFL teams share net gate revenue 60/40 percent between the home and visiting team. 15 They also
share permanent seat license and club seat revenue under certain circumstances. Baseball introduced a new revenue sharing system in
1996 wherein the top revenue team would be transferring approximately $18 million to the bottom team in 1999. Finally, it is important
to recall that a significant part of the return from owning a sports team
may not show up in the profit and loss statement. Apart from their ability to manipulate related-party transactions, owners reap substantial tax
sheltering benefits from player amortization schemes. They also benefit from capital gains, psychic income, ability to aid their other businesses, political access, and perquisites.
It is the total economic return that buyers consider when they contemplate owning a sports team. The definitive measure of this total
economic return is the franchise value, which is determined in the marketplace. The value only rises when the economic return to ownership
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rises. And here the numbers speak loudly and clearly: expansion fees
for an NBA franchise were $32.5 million in 1988 and $125 million in
1994. In November 1998, the New Jersey Nets sold for $150 million.
The Nets were ranked by Forbes as the fourteenth most valuable NBA
team out of twenty-nine in 1998, or, basically, in the middle of the
pack. 16 Based on these figures, NBA franchises have increased in
value nearly fivefold over the last ten years. This would not have happened if there were not a substantial and growing economic return to
ownership.

ASSESSING THE NEW COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Some sportswriters, player agents, and even the guru of sports
union leaders, Marvin Miller, have questioned the efficacy of union
leadership during the recent NBA lockout. While the final 1998–1999
CBA makes some significant concessions from the players’ perspective, the deal also contains some important gains for the union. Moreover, both the structure of the deal and the union’s accrued experience
from the process augur well for the next confrontation in 2005–2006.
The critics are right when they argue that Billy Hunter and Patrick
Ewing, the union president, may have made some mistakes. They are
wrong if they believe that Hunter and Ewing did not do a superlative
job under the circumstances.
The two significant concessions made by the union were accepting
a near hard cap at 55 percent of defined revenues during years four
through six of the agreement 17 and accepting a limit on individual
player salaries. Marvin Miller critiqued the deal, asserting that the role
of unions is to set minimum not maximum wages. Fair enough, but
Miller leaves out the following facts: a) the NBA has had a salary cap,
albeit porous, since 1983; b) the union was coming off a near devastating bargaining process in 1995 which sharply divided the players and
resulted in greater salary stratification; c) the NBA players had no prior
experience with work stoppages; d) the economic conditions of the
1990s are far different than those that prevailed in baseball when
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Miller’s players’ union cut its teeth; and e) the NBA owners conducted
a very controlled, deliberate, and sophisticated lockout.
Under the new deal, the salary cap remains at 48.04 percent of
defined revenues, and it remains subject to various exceptions. These
exceptions will allow team payrolls to go up to 55 percent of defined
revenues without any additional restraint. If aggregate payrolls go
above this percentage, however, the players will reimburse the owners
dollar for dollar of any overage up to 60.5 percent of revenues. If payrolls go above this latter level, then the owners whose teams’ payrolls
exceed the 60.5 percent threshold will pay a 100 percent tax on every
dollar of salary above this level. Thus, there are strong constraints built
into the system to keep player compensation expenses at 55 percent of
defined revenues in net terms, but there is certainly some wiggle room.
The point here is that the current deal has evolved out of the existing
salary cap institution. It was not created out of thin air.
What is new, even to basketball, is the acceptance of an absolute
limit on individual salaries. For 1999, the limits are $9 million for
players with less than 7 years of service, $11 million for players with
between 7 and 9 years, and $14 million for players with 10 or more
years. These limits will rise in step with NBA revenues and no existing
player will be forced to take a cut thanks to a grandfathering provision
that allows any salary to grow by 5 percent over its previous level. Further, these limits apply to the first year of a contract, but contracts for
Bird free agents can extend for seven years and grow at 12 percent of
the base salary per year. If these limits had been in place during the
last CBA, only three players would have been affected directly. The
potential problem here is not whether Patrick Ewing makes $20 million or $14 million (Ewing forfeited $8 million of his 1998–1999 salary from the lockout), it is that historically the star players were the
salary trailblazers for the entire league.
The owners stand to reap some handsome profits from these limitations. If net salaries remain at 55 percent of defined revenue, 18 then
under the assumptions in the new profit model, an average owner’s
profits would grow to $18.7 million in 2002–2003 on revenues of
$105.8 million. Because of the wiggle room in the system, however, it
is likely that some owners will go through the 60.5 percent trigger and
raise the overall net player share somewhat above 55 percent.
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One problem that basketball has had for many years and that was
exacerbated by the 1995 CBA is that the cap system, without sufficient
exceptions for mid-range players, generated a sharp class system
among the players. Rather than pulling up all salaries, the superstars
were forcing the salaries of most other players downward by occupying increasing amounts of cap room. This created not only a problem
of equity but also a problem for union solidarity that did not go unnoticed by the owners.
The new CBA scores appreciable gains for the players in recreating a middle-range salary scale. For instance, a new “middle class”
exception was added at $1.75 million for 1999, rising to the league
average salary in 2003. Teams can sign one player per year to one sixyear contract under this exception, even if the team has reached its 48
percent cap. Thus, by year six of the deal, some teams may have 6 of
its 12 players paid the league average salary. The union also scored
significant gains in minimum salaries, which now range from $287,500
to $1 million, depending on years of service, and substantial improvements in player retirement benefits.
Price regulation always creates strange outcomes. In the case of
the NBA cap, we are already seeing that some excellent (but not superstar quality) players have had their salaries shoot up to the maximum.
That is, instead of having, say, a Patrick Ewing at $18 million and a
Latrell Sprewell at $10 million, we might find them both at $14 million. And other players whose salaries are effectively constrained by
the maximum may find that the owners will give them a seven-year
deal at the maximum, instead of what, absent the new limits, might
have been a five-year deal at a few million more per year. This possibility will be especially beneficial to older veterans. In other words,
the owners will find a way to pay the players.
It is apparent that in the short run, a majority of players will either
gain from or be unaffected by this new CBA. The 55 percent threshold
is essentially the 57 percent the players attained in 1998 without
Michael Jordan’s salary. This is the key to understanding the union’s
dilemma and the eventual outcome.
In the early and mid 1970s, when Marvin Miller fashioned the
impressive solidarity and militance among baseball players, the minimum salary in baseball was $16,000 (in 1975) and the average salary
was $44,676 (in 1975). An average baseball player who sat out a
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whole season in 1975 would then lose less than one-fiftieth of what an
average NBA player in 1998–1999 would lose. Moreover, the potential gains in 1975 for the baseball players were astronomical if they
could move from the reserve system to a system of free agency.
Union director Billy Hunter did not have these advantages in 1998.
Nor did he have the advantage of a union with any history of struggle
and sacrifice. In their book Money Players, Armen Keteyian, Harvey
Araton, and Martin Dardis said this about the state of union politics in
1994: [Charlie] Grantham (then union director) knew his players were
not about to strike or tolerate being locked out. Worse still, Hunter
inherited a union that was bitterly divided over a failed decertification
vote in 1995 and highly unequal salary distributions.
The absence of a history of collective bargaining struggle is not
just the absence of an abstract notion of solidarity. Collective bargaining involves establishing practices of cohesion and strategic communication. Hunter faced strong criticism for being both too authoritarian
and too democratic. On the owners’ side, democracy was not an issue.
Commissioner David Stern called the shots and spoke for the 29 owners. Hunter needed to lead, but he could not get too far out in front of
his 400 players.
In October 1998, Hunter called a meeting for all union members in
Las Vegas. The issues and positions were exhaustively debated in
small and large groups. The meetings were open only to players and
union staff, but it was clear within days that David Stern knew what
was discussed and decided upon in Las Vegas. Indeed, individuals
from the Commissioner’s office have suggested that they had informants all along and knew about every move the union made.
Hunter was also accused of being David Falk’s puppet and, sometimes, Arn Tellum’s. Large parts of the media uncritically regurgitated
these claims. Yet anyone involved in the process, who spent time in the
union office or knew the deep integrity of Billy Hunter, knew that these
charges were utter nonsense. To be sure, the willingness of the union
staff initially to discuss and then accept limits on high-end salaries ran
diametrically counter to the interests of the big-time agents.
On the other hand, Hunter developed a wonderful rapport with the
players and his staff. He fashioned a strong unity out of division, and
he held the players together for several months of the lockout—itself a
Herculean feat. While the final settlement terms were not everything
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the union wanted, they were a very long way from the owners’ original
demands and even from the owners’ position when they supposedly
made their last offer in late December. What is remarkable about both
the process and the outcome is that under the circumstances Billy
Hunter and the union accomplished as much as they did.
In the future, the union will have this negotiating experience under
its belt and player salaries will be more compressed because of the
mid-range exemptions. Both changes augur well for union solidarity
and strength. Most important, the vast majority of NBA players are
pleased with the present deal and, therefore, with their union experience.
The first salary results from the new CBA are already in, and so far
it looks good for the players. They have increased their share in
defined revenues to approximately 59 percent (on a nonprorated basis),
even without Michael Jordan’s salary, which took up about 2 percentage points. The average player salary jumped to $2.8 million in 1998–
1999. Moreover, the players clearly have resurrected the middle-salary
range. On a nonprorated basis, the median player salary rose by more
than 20 percent from $1.4 million to $1.7 million. In 1998–1999, 13
players signed for the mid-level exception and 20 veteran players
signed for the new veteran minimum salary of $1 million. All told, in
1998–1999 there were 120 players with salaries between $1 million
and $2 million, compared with only 74 in the category in 1997–1998.
Further, the number of players with salaries below $1 million fell from
151 in 1997–1998 to 101 in 1999, and the number below $500,000 fell
from 85 in 1997–1998 to 40 in 1999.19 Of course, the more problematic years four through six of the new CBA (when the escrow tax kicks
in for player shares above 55 percent) are yet to come, but most players
cared more about the first three years and getting back to work. 20

THE NBA DEAL AND THE Y2K PROBLEM
Not surprisingly, the NBA’s new salary constraints and strong
profit expectations caught the attention of baseball and hockey owners.
For instance, Carl Pohlad, owner of the Minnesota Twins, praised the
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salary control aspects of the NBA deal and asserted: “We’ve got to
have some deal like the NBA’s if we are to survive.”21
Can we expect to find NBA-type changes in 2002 and 2003 when
the new MLB and NHL deals are negotiated? More generally, how
does the NBA deal fit into the changing landscape of professional
sports?
It is by now a cliche to note that the ownership of professional
team sports is changing. By one estimate, in early 1998, 66 public corporations had direct or indirect ownership interests in sports teams: 31
in MLB, 30 in the NHL, and 20 in the NBA. A large share of these
public companies are in the media business. Media-business-owned
teams often have a different objective than other teams; namely, the
team itself is not necessarily viewed as a profit center, but rather as
“software” or programming to promote the larger media empire. For
example, when FOX decided to pay the 33-year-old Kevin Brown $105
million over seven years beginning with the 1999 season, part of the
expected payoff was that Brown’s stature would help promote the FOX
network in the United States and abroad. CBS’ gargantuan contract
with the NFL is buying football along with its ratings as well as exposure and status for its other programming. In the fall of 1998, CBS led
the networks in prime time ratings. It is the first time CBS has topped
the charts this deep in the season since 1993, which was the last time
CBS had the NFL.22
Fifteen million dollars a year for a 40-year-old pitcher seven years
into the future is a lot of money and probably would not make sense
viewed from the perspective of a single baseball team. However,
Rupert Murdoch thinks Brown is worth at least $105 million to his
News Corporation, and he likely is right; but it is questionable whether
Brown would have been worth this much to the Los Angeles Dodgers
baseball team alone.
In early 1998, the 30 owners of MLB teams were debating whether
to allow Murdoch and his News Corporation to buy the Dodgers. After
their reported unanimous vote to allow the purchase, I asked one owner
if the baseball community didn’t have some serious reservations about
this sale. His reply was, “We didn’t have a choice.” He was referring
to the fact that the FOX regional sports network already had local contracts to televise 24 of baseball’s 30 teams. But there was another element as well. FOX was about to offer $310 million for the Dodgers, by
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far the highest purchase price for a team in baseball’s history. Baseball’s owners were happy to have Murdoch push up the value of their
teams, but now when Murdoch also breaks the salary scale, the owners
cry that he is upsetting competitive balance.
The media-company-as-team-owner phenomenon is just the latest
irritant to the competitive balance mixture in professional team sports.
Owners have long argued that teams from larger cities had an advantage over those from smaller cities; and, especially in the 1990s, teams
with new facilities generating tens of millions of dollars in additional
revenues were seen as having a competitive edge over teams playing in
older facilities. That is, a team from a large city or with a new facility
or owned by a media conglomerate would be able and willing to outbid
other teams to procure top player talent.
In theory, this argument always made some economic sense. In
practice, however, the advantaged teams were not dominating their
leagues (save in baseball during the pre–free agency, predraft era).
Indeed, some even argued that it would have been in the leagues’ best
financial interests if the big city teams did dominate because having
those teams in the playoffs would raise aggregate fan interest along
with television ratings.
Beginning in the mid 1990s, however, the big-city/new-facility/
media-owned teams in baseball began to monopolize the postseason
landscape. During the 1998–1999 offseason, many of the other teams
publicly gave up and waived a white handkerchief before the season
began. Owners such as Carl Pohlad, whose net worth is $1.3 billion
according to Forbes, decided that maintaining a payroll in the $25–$45
million range would not allow them to win their divisions. Therefore,
their profit-maximizing strategy is to minimize their payrolls to $10–
$15 million. Pohlad now follows the ignominious example of his fellow owner Wayne Huizenga. Each attempted to punish his fans for not
supporting the team in the building of a new stadium with public
funds.23
While the revenue disparity between the richest and poorest baseball team was around $30 million in 1989, by 1998 it was close to $120
million. To this volatility, add the presence of new franchise owners
who also own international communications networks and who value
their ballplayers not only by what they do on the field but what they do
for their networks. Further, baseball’s expansion by four teams in the
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1990s, while adding excitement to the game, diluted the talent pool and
made the star players stand out more and, thereby, made it easier to buy
a winning team.
Baseball tried to address these inequalities in the last collective
bargaining agreement. However, it is now clear that the agreement’s
plan to share revenue among the teams (wherein in 1999 the top team
with revenues around $200 million would transfer approximately $18
million to the bottom team with revenues around $40 million) and the
luxury payroll tax (wherein the top five payroll teams in 1999 would
pay a 34 percent tax on that portion of team salaries above approximately $76 million) did not go nearly far enough toward leveling the
imbalances.
Consider these statistics. In 1998, of the 8 teams that made the
playoffs, all were among the top 12 teams in payroll. Further, of these
top 12 teams, all had winning percentages above 0.500, save the Baltimore Orioles who finished at 0.488. Of the bottom 18 teams in payroll, only 2 teams finished above 0.500. Of the bottom ten teams in
payroll, none finished above 0.475. Put differently, in 1998 no team
made the playoffs without spending at least $47 million on payroll, and
no team spending less than $38 million had a winning record.
Some of these results, no doubt, are from poor management or
owner machinations. But others have to do with the underlying institutions and incentives of ownership in Major League Baseball.
With varying degrees of success, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA
have avoided the pitfall of advantaged-team domination. The NFL formula is simple: extensive revenue sharing among the owners, reverse
order draft, unbalanced schedule, prohibition against corporate ownership, and a fungible salary cap set at 63 percent of league-defined gross
revenues. The NHL formula entails curtailing unrestricted free agency
until a player reaches 31 years of age, limitations on player sales, and a
reverse order draft. The NBA, as we have seen, albeit dominated in
recent years by the big-city Chicago Bulls, owes the strength of many
of its small-city teams, such as the Utah Jazz, to the Larry Bird exception to its salary cap.
If and when competitive balance problems manifest themselves in
other sports, as they appear to be doing now in baseball, affected
leagues would do well to study the NFL example of revenue sharing.
By dividing equally all revenue from the national television contract
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(an average of $2.2 billion a year over the next eight years) and
national licensing, splitting the net gate 60/40, as well as sharing other
revenue sources, the NFL has attained unprecedented balance. Though
arguably the NFL’s system should be modified because the league
offers owners little or no profit incentive to win.
The NBA response to revenue inequality among its teams has been
to attempt to lower the player share in league revenue and to turn the
soft cap into a hard cap. That is, the NBA has made the players bear
the burden of revenue inequality among the owners. Baseball owners
attempted a similar solution in 1994–1995. In both cases the outcome
was predictable—a lengthy work stoppage. At the very least, the burden of dealing with inequalities needs to be shared. Players should
accept some additional restraints, but owners need to do additional revenue sharing. Further, to guard against free riding, teams should be
required to meet certain payroll standards (e.g., 80 percent of average
league payroll) to qualify as a beneficiary of revenue sharing.
In January 1999, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, seemingly
inspired by the new NBA and the lofty contract for Kevin Brown,
formed a committee to study the issue of competitive balance in baseball. Selig appointed several luminaries to the committee, including
former Federal Reserve head Paul Volcker and former U.S. Senator
George Mitchell, along with several owners. Although some technical
questions exist within the issue of competitive balance, the more
important and less tractable problems are political. Without union representatives, Selig’s committee risks generating solutions that appeal to
only one side.
In 1994, the baseball owners, after studying competitive balance,
convinced themselves that a salary cap was needed, but they never convinced the players. The result was a strike and no World Series that
year. Even if baseball owners eventually decide that the solution is
more revenue sharing among themselves rather than new artificial constraints on salaries, the nature of the sharing is something that the
union must ratify.
Of course, it is far from simple to convince advantaged owners to
increase revenue sharing by voluntarily taxing themselves. These owners would argue that they paid more for their advantaged franchise and
that additional taxation amounts to a form of asset confiscation. However, unbalanced competition and work stoppages will also lower the
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value of their asset—and possibly by more than additional revenue
sharing.
It is a stretch to think that the new NBA deal is easily transferable
to baseball or hockey, which have never operated with a salary cap.
Indeed, both the NFL and NBA caps were around in 1994–1995 during
the last negotiations in hockey and baseball. 24 The MLB and NHL
owners were emboldened, but so were the players.
If owners and players are unable to resolve the problem of competitive balance on their own, then it will be up to Washington politicians
to awaken from their long-standing sports slumber. The natural economic solution for professional sports is competition. With two
leagues in each sport, monopoly teams in big cities will soon find
another team from the competing league in their territory. The artificial shortage of teams will evaporate and deserving cities will no
longer have to compete against each other through public subsidies to
get teams. This will erode the competitive imbalance problems from
new facilities and larger cities.
The public policy solution is straightforward: pass legislation that
will break each league up into competing business entities.

Notes
1. In reality, teams in these leagues both cooperate and compete as businesses, but it
is their cooperation in certain areas that distinguishes them from other businesses.
2. For instance, in a league with 30 teams, the first 15 picks could be given to the
bottom 15 clubs in reverse order to finish in the previous season. The next 15
picks could go to the 15 clubs with the lowest revenue or rent (potential revenue
from site). The third 15 picks could go to the top 15 clubs in reverse order of their
finish, etc. “Rent” refers to potential revenue given the characteristics of the city
and site. Internationalizing the draft along with our rule changes would also benefit competitive balance.
3. Although this strategy has been employed in all leagues (though not in baseball
since 1972), the NFL experience shows it can be problematic. In particular, it can
create political problems in the abandoned city and eventually force the league to
add an expansion team in order to restore a team to the city. Should this occur, the
league loses some control over its output and, hence, some of its monopoly power.
4. Actually, under the new agreement Jordan’s salary could not increase by more
than 5 percent. Because his salary last year was $33 million, the Bulls could have
paid Jordan $34.65 million in 1998–1999 (prorated for the number of games
played in the shortened season).
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5. The correlation is even weaker when team salary was lagged a year and when
MSA population was controlled. Quirk and Fort (1999) present rank correlation
statistics that show this relationship is stronger in the NBA than the other leagues
in the 1990s. It is likely that this tighter correlation in the NBA can be explained
entirely by the Bulls’ exceptional success and high payroll due to the presence of
Michael Jordan.
6. See definition in text, p. 97.
7. Data from the NBPA.
8. The middle-salary exception allows for a team to pay a player a mid-range salary
even if it puts the team over the top.
9. The average salary in 1997–1998 is sometimes represented as $2.6 million. The
$2.6 million figure includes only full-time roster players. The $2.4 million
includes all players under contract.
10. The author served as a consultant to NBPA during 1998–1999.
11. See my elaboration of this point in “A Miami Fish Story,” The New York Times
Magazine, October 18, 1998.
12. Since it does not have a minor league system, the NBA’s player development
expenses principally consist of scouting and come to no more than 1 or 2 percent
of the average team’s expenses. On the economics of college basketball, see Zimbalist (1999).
13. This estimate was performed by Michael Ozanian, who had done similar estimates for all the major sports leagues for several years for Financial World before
joining the staff at Forbes.
14. Corporation Sourcebook of Statistics of Income, 1990–1997; also in Business
Week, various issues.
15. The actual system in football is to share the gate 60/40 after the home team has
deducted 15 percent of the gross gate for theoretical stadium costs. Thus, the
actual distribution of the gross is roughly 66/34.
16. Michael Ozanian, “Selective Accounting,” Forbes, December 14, 1998, p. 127.
17. Year seven of the deal is at the owners’ option. If they exercise the option, the 55
percent threshold rises to 57 percent in the seventh year.
18. The agreement actually calls for the introduction of a new revenue concept, Core
Basketball Revenues or CBR. CBR will consist of gate receipts, all broadcasting
revenue, luxury suite receipts, NBA properties revenue and certain other revenue
to be determined. CBR will come into effect in the 1999–2000 season, and the
BRI percentages will all be converted to a CBR basis.
19. For 1998–1999 the maximum player salary only affected two veteran players, Rik
Smits in the senior category and Jayson Williams in the middle category (7–9
years of service). Ten players in the junior category, however, were affected with
an average salary of around $12 million in the group over the lives of their contracts. These players were Shareef Abdur-Rahim, Ray Allen, Kobe Bryant,
Zydrunas Ilgauskus, Allen Iverson, Stephon Marbury, Antonio McDyess, Arvydas
Sabonis, Damon Stoudamire, and Antoine Walker.
20. Data are preliminary from National Basketball Players’ Association.
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21. Quoted in the Sports Business Daily, February 11, 1999.
22. I do not mean to suggest that the only cause of CBS’ rating rise was its NFL contract, only that it helped. To be sure, it could not have hurt CBS when the Seinfeld
show went off NBC after the 1997–1998 season.
23. A kind of reverse strategy was employed by the Seattle Mariners in 1997 and the
San Diego Padres in 1998. In order to arouse public support for new stadiums,
these teams fielded championship teams, only to dismantle them after their referenda for publicly funded new facilities had passed.
24. To be sure, it is likely that the NFL constraints on the salaries of franchise players
are more severe than the $14 million cap (in 1998–1999) on veteran free agents in
the NBA. Each NFL team can designate a franchise player. The services of this
player can be automatically retained by the team if the player is offered compensation at the average of the top five paid players at his position in the NFL or 120
percent of the player’ previous salary, whichever is greater.
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6
A Level Playing Field?
Sports and Discrimination
Lawrence M. Kahn
Cornell University

Economists and the public at large have become increasingly interested in the issue of discrimination in sports. The public perceives that
to some degree the sports business is an oasis of equal economic
opportunity for minorities, who in this setting are judged and compensated solely on the basis of their performance. This impression is
underscored by the high level of minority representation in our major
team sports. As of the mid 1990s, Major League Baseball (MBL) was
about 30 percent black, the National Football League (NFL) was 65
percent black, and black players made up 80 percent of the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA’s) ranks (Staudohar 1996). Further,
some of the highest paid athletes are black: some multiyear NBA contracts for black players top $100 million; in baseball, a majority of the
players who made at least $8 million in 1998 were black, despite the
30 percent black representation in the MLB; and in the NFL, while
most of the highest paid players in 1997 were quarterbacks (a disproportionately white position, as I will discuss later), there were many
prominent, highly paid black players as well.
Despite this evidence of economic achievement, there is an ominous undercurrent in the treatment of black professional athletes. Until
the 1940s, of course, black players were excluded from professional
team sports. And while African Americans are well-represented as
players in the 1990s, they are much less likely to be coaches, managers, or executives for sports teams. Anecdotal accounts of team sports
identify many instances in which African-American players perceived
quotas against them, even in basketball, which as noted, is overwhelmingly black (Bradley 1976; Halberstam 1981). In 1987, a baseball
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team executive claimed that black athletes did not have the qualities
necessary to become managers or executives, and in 1988 a wellknown broadcaster was fired for making racist comments (Staudohar
1996). Several players in the 1998 NBA lockout viewed the league’s
hostility as racially based (Samuels 1998). And golf and tennis, after
years of being almost completely white sports at the professional level,
still have few black players on tour. In many instances, tournaments in
these sports have been played at clubs that do not accept African Americans as members.
Public attention focuses on issues of race and sports in part
because of the celebrity of the players involved. Moreover, the history
of racial integration in sports, beginning with the hiring of Jackie Robinson by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 and soon continuing in football
and basketball leagues has been an especially dramatic story. The process of racial integration in sports assumed national importance
because it took place against the background of African Americans’
struggle in the 1950s and 1960s for civil rights.
In this talk, I survey evidence economists have gathered on the
extent of discrimination in sports. As I will show, discrimination can
take on several forms, each of which has been the subject of economic
research. Although the anecdotal evidence mentioned earlier is suggestive of the mistreatment of black players, we need to know what the
anecdotes add up to. Are they isolated incidents, or are they symptomatic of general patterns and trends in professional sports? These questions can only be answered by studies that use statistical evidence. In
this vein, I will talk about economic research on discrimination in
sports with respect to salaries, hiring, retention, positional segregation,
and customer prejudice.

ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ANALYZING DISCRIMINATION
IN SPORTS
Before discussing evidence on discrimination in sports, it will be
useful to make clear what I mean by “discrimination” and what economics has to say in general about the issue. Beginning with the seminal contribution of Gary Becker (1957), economists have usually
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defined labor market discrimination as the unequal treatment of
equally qualified workers. Becker (1957) identified three forms of discrimination: employer, co-worker, and customer. As we will see, each
of these forms has occurred in the sports business.
In the Becker model under competition, assuming profit-maximization by at least one firm and constant returns to scale, we expect
entry and exit to eliminate employer and co-worker discrimination.
Discriminating employers will be driven out of business by the nondiscriminator(s). As analyzed in Chapter 4 of Becker (1957), if there is
co-worker discrimination, then in equilibrium we expect equally competitive segregated firms with equal pay for equal work. However, customer discrimination is different in that an employer who pays more
money to workers whom customers prefer to deal with is likely to be
rewarded by the market relative to one who does not make such distinctions. While workers not preferred by customers may be able to
find work in the noncustomer sector, in a general equilibrium context,
there is no guarantee that their incomes will not be hurt by the existence of customer discrimination (Kahn 1991a). And if these nonpreferred workers have a comparative advantage in the customer sector,
then they may still choose to stay there even if they face the effects of
customer discrimination.
These features of the economics of customer discrimination suggest that competitive forces are less likely by themselves to eliminate
this form of discrimination than discrimination based on employer or
co-worker prejudice. The sports industry is perhaps the most prominent example of a customer-based service sector. Further, because
sports leagues are monopolies, they may not face the kind of free entry
that might serve to discipline discriminating employers. Thus, we
expect that the economic forces tending to eliminate discrimination in
sports are perhaps weaker than in other industries.
A common difficulty labor economists have faced in testing for the
existence of labor market discrimination is suggested by the definition
I just explained. Namely, while it may be easy in many cases to tell
who is paid more money, discerning if there is unequal pay for equally
qualified workers can be a major problem. This difficulty has affected
discrimination research on the labor force at large because databases
such as those from the census can only tell us how many years of
school a person completed, his/her age and marital status, and some-
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what crude measures of where he/she works. For example, based on
the census, the “productivity” of a 25-year-old minor league hockey
player who played two years of college hockey is indistinguishable
from that of a 25-year-old NBA star such as Magic Johnson, who
turned pro after his sophomore year, and who in 1984 had already been
the NBA finals’ most valuable player (MVP) in 1980 and 1982. Is any
pay gap between these two individuals evidence of unequal pay for
equal work? In contrast to the census, in sports we have excellent controls for productivity, as indicated, for example, in The Baseball Encyclopedia . The sports industry provides us with an excellent
opportunity to study discrimination because data on player race, compensation, and performance are so readily available.

EVIDENCE ON DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS
In the early days of baseball integration, there was considerable evidence to support Becker’s (1957) notions of employer, customer, and
co-worker discrimination. First, employers discriminate if they treat
the output of, for example, black workers, as less valuable than the
identical output of white workers. If all employers have the same tastes
for discrimination, then a common “discrimination coefficient” that
describes this discount in dollar terms for the pay of black workers will
result. A nondiscriminating employer can earn more money than a discriminator by hiring the most productive workers at the lowest cost possible, regardless of race, an opportunity that discriminators forgo. This
prediction has been tested in the context of MLB’s integration. Specifically, some teams, particularly those in the National League in the late
1940s and 1950s, were more active in bringing black players onto their
rosters than were teams in the American League (Gwartney and
Haworth 1974; Hanssen 1998). Teams that were more willing to use
black players had significantly more success on the playing field than
those that were not, an outcome predicted by Becker’s (1957) model.
Second, there was some evidence of co-worker prejudice in the
early days of baseball integration when the St. Louis Cardinals threatened to strike rather than play against a black player, Jackie Robinson. 1
Further, at least one Dodger player asked for a trade rather than play
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alongside Robinson, illustrating the tendency toward segregation, as
predicted by Becker (1957). Third, there were many instances of customer prejudice, including death threats against Robinson in his early
years with the Dodgers.
The labor market manifestation of these forms of discrimination
can include salary discrimination (unequal pay for equal work), hiring
discrimination, retention discrimination, and positional segregation. A
considerable volume of research has attempted to determine the extent
of these outcomes.2 Salary discrimination is probably the most studied
issue, with a research design that can be described by the following
equation:
Eq. 1

ln S = B'Z + aWHITE + u,

where for individual players in a given sport, S is compensation, B is a
vector of regression coefficients, Z is a vector of performance indicators, team characteristics, and market characteristics, WHITE is a
dummy variable equaling 1 for white players, and u is an error term.
This setup is similar to much work in labor economics that attempts to
assess the extent of discrimination by estimating a, the coefficient on
WHITE.3 What differs about sports is both the accuracy of the compensation data (that may in many cases come directly from the relevant
players’ union, which keeps copies of the actual player contracts) and
the very detailed set of performance indicators available on athletes.
A major difficulty in conducting labor market research on discrimination using models like Eq. 1 is that WHITE may be correlated with
unmeasured productivity, controlling for the measured variables Z; if
so, then its estimated coefficient will be biased. In sports, we have
much better controls than in labor market data in general. For example, a widely used data source such as the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) allows one to control for years of schooling,
type of degree, length of labor market experience, firm seniority, union
coverage, and three-digit industry and occupation classification. In
contrast, the Baseball Encyclopedia and other baseball data sources
allow one to control for batting average, stolen bases, home runs,
career length, team success, and a variety of other performance indicators. In addition, “occupation” in baseball is one’s position, a far more
detailed indicator than exists in the census classification, which is used
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by the PSID. All players at the major or minor league level in all sports
would get the same three-digit occupation (“athletes”) and industry
(“entertainment and recreation services”) in the census classification.
Because of far better controls for individual performance, occupation,
and firm in sports, we presume that any correlation between WHITE
and u, given Z, is much less severe in sports than in more general labor
market data bases.
Analyses of equations like Eq. 1 have produced the most evidence
of salary discrimination in professional basketball. In the mid 1980s,
controlling for various performance and market-related statistics, there
were statistically significant black salary shortfalls of 11–25 percent,
depending on sample and specification.4 The apparent discrimination
was especially noteworthy because, as Table 1 shows, for the 1985–
1986 season, black players on average earned $407,000, while whites
earned $397,000. However, Table 1 also shows that black players outdid whites in major performance categories such as playing time, scoring, and rebounding. In fact, using a regression like Eq. 1, which
controlled for performance and market-related variables, Kahn and
Sherer (1988) found the ceteris paribus WHITE effect to be 21–25 percent, and this was highly statistically significant. This combination of
results shows how important it can be to control for productivity, which
Table 1 Pay and Career Performance in the NBA
Year

Black players

White players

1985–1986
Salary ($)

407,190

396,570

Minutes/game

25.45

20.86

Points/game

12.11

8.69

4.8

4.4

1,622,972

1,384,010

Minutes/game

23.9

18.7

Points/game

10.5

7.8

4.4

3.5

Rebounds/game
1994–1996
Salary ($)

Rebounds/game

SOURCE: Kahn and Sherer (1988); Hamilton (1997).
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in this case was higher for black players, in assessing the extent of discrimination. While variables may have been omitted that could have
explained the ceteris paribus white salary advantage, reverse regression tests (which can under some restricted circumstances take account
of such problems [Goldberger 1984]), showed even larger apparent
discrimination coefficients (Kahn and Sherer 1988).
By the mid 1990s, there was evidence of unexplained black salary
shortfalls only among the elite players in the NBA. Table 1 shows that,
overall, blacks in 1994–1995 now outearned whites by about $240,000
and continued to outperform whites. Hamilton (1997) found for the
1994–1995 season that, all else equal, there were no overall significant
racial salary differentials in the NBA. The point estimate in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression like Eq. 1 was 0.010 for WHITE
with a standard error of 0.093. 5 However, Table 2 shows that salary
differentials were not uniform across the distribution. In particular,
black players outearned whites through the 75th percentile, while
among players near the top (the 90th percentile), whites were paid a
slight $16,000 more than blacks. White stars did better relative to
black stars than whites did among the journeymen. To examine the
question of unequal pay for equal performance across the distribution
of playing talent, Hamilton (1997) used quantile regressions like the
following:
Eq. 2

(Y90|Z) = B90'Z + a90 × WHITE,

where Y90|Z is the 90th percentile of conditional distribution of log salaries given Z and B90 and a90 are quantile regression coefficients. In
Table 2 Black and White NBA Salaries by Distribution Percentile,
1994–1995 ($)
Percentile
10

White players
150,000

Black players
270,000

25

250,000

752,000

50

1,036,500

1,417,500

75

2,135,000

2,333,500

90

3,260,000

3,243,800

SOURCE: Hamilton (1997).
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particular, a90 tells us the WHITE log salary advantage for players at
the 90th percentile of the conditional distribution of log salary.
Regressions such as Eq. 2 can be run for any distribution quantile,
and the associated WHITE coefficients provide estimates of the unexplained salary premia for white players across the distribution. When
Hamilton (1997) estimated models like Eq. 2, he found no significant
racial salary differentials at the 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles but
positive and significant WHITE pay effects (at the 5.6 percent and 12
percent levels in two-tailed tests) at the 75th and 90th percentiles
amounting to 0.18 to 0.19 log points.6 These results suggest that while
there was no significant unexplained black salary shortfall on average
in the NBA in the 1994–1995 season, for star or near-star players (i.e.,
those at the 75th percentile and above in the conditional wage distribution), there may have been substantial discrimination in favor of
whites. Again, the importance of controlling for performance is underscored because these white salary advantages are not apparent in Table
2, which, of course, does not control for performance.
In contrast to these findings of white pay advantage, ceteris paribus, in the NBA, similar OLS analyses of salaries in baseball and football have not found much evidence of racial salary discrimination
against minorities. For example, in baseball, these analyses never find
that being white has a positive effect. Among nonpitchers, in fact, significantly negative effects of being white were found in 1977 and 1987
(Christiano 1986 and 1988) and during the 1985–1991 period (Irani
1996). On the other hand, Kahn’s (1993) analysis of 1987 data, using
the same wage sample as Christiano (1988), found that these negative
effects of being white disappeared when a longer list of productivity
variables was added. In football in 1989, Kahn (1992) found ceteris
paribus salary premia discrimination coefficients in favor of whites of
only 1–4 percent, and these were usually not statistically significant.
Kahn (1992) did find, however, that in the NFL, nonwhite players did
better in areas with a larger relative nonwhite population than with a
small relative nonwhite population; and whites did better in more white
metropolitan areas. These findings suggest the influence of customers,
but they did not add up to large overall racial salary differences in the
NFL.
It is perhaps noteworthy that the one sport with the most evidence
of racial salary discrimination, basketball, was the sport with the larg-
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est black representation as of the mid 1990s at 80 percent, in contrast
to baseball’s 30 percent and football’s 65 percent.7 These differences
in racial representation suggest that customer preferences may have
something to do with the racial pay gap we observed in basketball.
And there is indeed evidence from the 1980s consistent with the existence of such preferences. For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that, all else equal, during the 1980–1986 period each white player
generated 5,700 to 13,000 additional fans per year. The dollar value of
this extra attendance more than made up for the white salary premium. 8
And other researchers found a close match between the racial makeup
of NBA teams in the 1980s and the areas where they were located,
again suggesting the importance of customer preferences (Brown,
Spiro, and Keenan 1991; Burdekin and Idson 1991; Hoang and
Rascher 1999).
However, by the 1990s, customer preferences for white players
were less evident. Dey (1997), for example, found that, all else equal,
white players added a statistically insignificant and economically relatively unimportant 60 fans apiece per season during the 1987–1993
period. This evidence is consistent with the decline in the NBA’s overall, unexplained white salary premium from the 1980s to the 1990s,
although Hamilton’s (1997) finding for whites near the top of the distribution still suggests fan preferences for big name white players. It is
possible that white stars add fans even if the average white player does
not.
Customer discrimination has also been found for baseball. For
example, Hanssen (1998) found that white players added baseball fans,
all else equal, for the 1954–1972 period, and Irani (1996) obtained a
similar finding in baseball for 1972–1991. Moreover, Nardinelli and
Simon (1990) found that, controlling for performance, in 1989, baseball cards for white players sold at a significantly higher price than
those of black players, providing further evidence of fan prejudice.
The lack of a white salary premium in baseball in the face of these customer preferences remains a puzzle. Perhaps the positional segregation and apparent retention discrimination in baseball (see the
following paragraphs) are the ways in which such preferences affect
the baseball labor market.
Other possible types of racial discrimination in sports involve hiring, retention, and assignment discrimination. These take the form of
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unequal probabilities of being drafted or retained, as well as positional
segregation. First, regarding the draft, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that there were small, insignificant racial differences actually favoring
black players in draft order among NBA players on rosters in 1985,
conditional on college performance. This suggested the absence of hiring discrimination in the NBA, but we had no information on those not
drafted or not on rosters. In the NFL, Conlin and Emerson (1998)
found indirect evidence that black players were drafted later than
whites of equal playing ability during the 1986–1991 period. Again,
without information on those not drafted or not making the roster, we
have incomplete evidence on hiring discrimination. But Conlin and
Emerson’s (1998) results suggest barriers to black players in the NFL.
Second, regarding retention, Jiobu (1988) found that from 1971 to
1985 in Major League Baseball, black players had a significantly
higher exit rate than whites, controlling for performance, position, and
age at entry. Because baseball is likely to be virtually all major league
players’ best career opportunity, a reasonable interpretation of these
exit hazard differences is that they reflect team decisions not to offer
players a new contract. And Hoang and Rascher (1999) found a similar result for the NBA: Other things equal, during the 1980–1991
period, white players had about two additional years of career length
(36 percent) than black players, again suggesting retention discrimination. Whether this disparity will hold up in the 1990s or whether, like
the overall effects of race on attendance and NBA salaries, it will dwindle, is an interesting question for future researchers.
Third, positional segregation by race has been noted in baseball
and football. Christiano (1988), for example, found that black baseball
players in 1987 were overrepresented in the outfield and underrepresented at infield and catcher. Kahn (1992) found that in the NFL in
1989, nonwhite players were overrepresented at running back, wide
receiver, and defensive back and underrepresented at quarterback,
kicker, punter and offensive line (see Figure 1). Whether this segregation represents current discrimination, past discrimination by high
school or college coaches, or self-selection is an open question, and
there is lively but inconclusive debate about these issues (Kahn 1991b).
Regardless of the cause of segregation, it appears to have some modest
consequences toward a slight salary gap favoring white football players. Table 3 shows that the overall white salary advantage of 4 percent

Figure 1 Percent Nonwhite by Position, NFL 1989
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SOURCE: Data from Kahn (1992).
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Table 3 White/Nonwhite Salary Ratio by Position, NFL 1989
Players who were
nonwhite
(%)

White/nonwhite
salary ratio

Punter

10.7

1.13

Offensive line

24.5

1.07

Defensive line

61.8

1.04

Tight end

47.3

0.99

Placekicker

14.3

0.96

Defensive back

91.6

0.94

Linebacker

64.0

0.91

Running back

91.0

0.69

Wide receiver

86.2

0.66

6.2

0.51

60.1

1.04

Position

Quarterback
Total
SOURCE: Data from Kahn (1992).

is greater than it is for most of the NFL positions (the three positions
where whites outearn blacks account for only 33 percent of the league).
In fact, if nonwhites had the white representation at each position but
kept their own position-specific salary levels, then they would outearn
whites by an average of about $88,000. With their actual positional
representation, nonwhites earned $13,000 less than whites. In baseball, segregation has future consequences to the extent that managers
are drawn from the middle infield positions, which have been disproportionately white (Scully 1989). 9

CONCLUSIONS
On the surface, it looks as though professional sports have come a
long way since the 1940s when black players were banned from participating. As of the 1990s, African Americans are much more than pro-
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portionately represented at the major league level and earn on average
millions of dollars in baseball and basketball. Further, pure salary discrimination, which may have been extensive in the 1980s in the NBA,
appears to have declined by the 1990s and may currently be limited to
white stars; and there is no evidence of salary discrimination in baseball and little in football. On the basis of these facts, one is tempted to
conclude that discrimination in sports is a nonproblem.
Yet there is evidence that fans have or have had racial preferences
in basketball, football, and baseball. Do these preferences have any
consequences, as predicted by the economic theory of discrimination?
The answer is that while overt salary discrimination is not a major outcome of these preferences (other than for the NBA in the 1980s or
white NBA stars in the 1990s), there is some evidence that reflects hiring discrimination, positional segregation, and retention discrimination. With customer preferences continuing in many instances for
white players and with evidence for these alternative forms of discrimination, professional sports and society at large have some distance to
travel before they can say they have truly eliminated discrimination.

Notes
1. This discussion of race and baseball is based on Okrent and Wulf (1989) and
Tygiel (1983).
2. For a survey of this evidence through the 1980s, see Kahn (1991b).
3. In some instances, researchers have used separate regressions for white and nonwhite players, reflecting or testing the possibility that performance is rewarded
differently by race.
4. See for example, Kahn and Sherer (1988), Koch and Vander Hill (1988), Wallace
(1988), and Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991).
5. Other analyses of basketball salaries in the 1990s also failed to find ceteris paribus racial salary differentials. See Dey (1997) and Bodvarsson and Brastow
(1998).
6. The WHITE results for the lower percentiles were –0.184 (asymptotic standard
error 0.291) for the 10th percentile, –0.209 (0.183) for the 25th percentile, and
–0.005 (0.152) for the 50th percentile.
7. These figures were very similar in the 1980s as well. See Staudohar (1996).
8. Hoang and Rascher (1999) also examined NBA attendance during the 1980–1991
period and found that, other things equal, larger values of (percent white on the
team/percent white in the city) were significantly positively associated with attendance. This finding is consistent with the idea of customer preferences for white
players.
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9. A lively literature has developed on the issue of discrimination against French
Canadians in the National Hockey League. Some authors have found apparent
discrimination against this group in Canadian cities outside Quebec province, a
pattern consistent with the notion of customer discrimination (Jones and Walsh
1988; Longley 1995). Yet others have disputed this interpretation and the findings
as well (Krashinsky and Krashinsky 1997). There is also a debate over whether
French Canadians face entry barriers into the NHL, with some authors alleging
that French Canadians need to have a higher performance level to be drafted as
early as English Canadians (Walsh 1992; Lavoie, Grenier, and Coulombe 1992).
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